Joint Sino-Russian military exercises are taking place around Vladivostok and East China's Shandong Peninsula. The exercises, which draw to a close on Aug. 25, have been dubbed the "Peace Mission 2005."
Above all else, this is a breakthrough in the policies of both nations, who are cooperating for the first time with the military forces of a non-allied nation. The significance of this action is threefold.
First, both China and Russia are gradually shedding their mutual suspicions. Extensive negotiations have finally resolved disputes over the thousands of kilometers of land border between the two nations, and they are now moving toward building mutual trust and becoming continental allies.
Second, from the selection of the location for the exercise and the insistence by both sides that it is not directed at any third nation, it is clear that the political significance of the exercises outweighs the military value. Third, the atmosphere of a new Cold War in the Asia-Pacific has been heightened. Following the regular US-Japanese and US-South Korean military drills, China has held several joint anti-terrorism and sea rescue exercises with the UK, Indonesia and France. It is now embarking on large-scale military exercises with Russia. This new Cold War is sometimes obvious and sometimes hidden.
So why have China and Russia chosen to carry out these unprecedented war games at this time? And what are their intentions? The intentions that Beijing and Moscow share in carrying out the military exercises seem legitimate at first glance -- ? enhancing their anti-terrorist capability, especially against Islamic fundamentalism in the Xinjiang region and the Middle East; and, jointly resisting pressure from the US.
The US has been putting pressure on China and Russia through NATO in Europe and the US-Japan alliance in East Asia. Following the Sept. 11 incident, the US has further intervened in the Middle East, making both China and Russia feel still more threatened by the possibility of being militarily hemmed in.
Third, China and Russia are making joint efforts to tackle the North Korean nuclear issue, as any deterioration on this front will have a negative impact on both nations. Also, their choice of Shandong as the location of military exercises was because of its proximity to the Korean Peninsula. So both countries are taking the strategic potential of this region into account.
China and Russia also have more selfish objectives. Moscow hopes that staging joint military exercises will encourage Beijing to sign a massive arms deal to buy more Russian weapons.
Meanwhile, it can gain a better understanding of China's military capabilities. China wants to improve ties with Russia, hoping that Moscow will agree to sell it more advanced and effective weapons systems, and possibly nuclear ones. China hopes to elevate relations with Russia to make it a potential counterweight against the psychological threat posed by the US-Japan alliance.
What impact will the exercises have on Asia-Pacific security? China's "hegemonic" rising has become a key threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region. The decision on the location of the exercises came after a disagreement with Russia over Beijing's initial desire for the exercises to take place further south, opposite Taiwan -- over which it hopes to gain control, by force if necessary.
At least Russia recognizes the sensitivity of the situation, and was unwilling to act provocatively in the face of the designation of the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective" by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee. Nor does it wish to cause undue anxiety for Taiwan.
Hung Mao-hsiung is a standing committee member of the Taiwan International Studies Association.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI
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