The strategic rivalry between China and the US is becoming more pronounced. The most recent example of this is Uzbekistan telling the US to close a military base used for operations against Afghanistan within six months. The move came soon after a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- which includes China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan -- sought eviction of Western (principally US) forces in Central Asia.
Both China and Russia are keen to get the US out of Central Asia, and both regard its presence there as a threat to their security. The region has assumed even greater importance since it was found to be rich in oil.
The trigger for the eviction order from Uzbek President Islam Karimov was US pressure for an independent inquiry into an anti-government uprising in the country that resulted in a large number of deaths. Beijing has sided with the regime, which regards the protesters as terrorists.
China is stepping into the region as a political and economic benefactor. Beijing seems to be setting the agenda in Central Asia, with Moscow giving the impression of being the dutiful deputy. This would not be a healthy development for the two countries in the longer term. But that is another story. At present, both China and Russia are keen to get the US out of the region before it gets too comfortable.
For the oligarchs of these former Soviet republics, the experience of Georgia and Ukraine, where democratic regimes have been ushered in with US encouragement, is quite disturbing. China and Russia favor the political status quo, thus posing no threat to existing regimes.
Political stability in Central Asian republics is important for China to keep Xinjiang insulated from regional turbulence. A separatist movement has been active in Xinjiang for a long time.
The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US brought China closer to the US, enabling it to liken Uighur separatism with al-Qaeda. Flushed with China's apparent cooperation against global terrorism, Washington placed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an otherwise obscure organization, on its list of terrorist organizations. Washington thus gave legitimacy to China's repression of Uighur nationalism, as it did with Russia in Chechnya in the wake of Sept. 11.
Chechnya's tragedy has been in the public eye for many years now. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia could not cope with the restless, independence-seeking Chechens. But the Uighur cause is not as well known because the Chinese empire, with all its repressive apparatus, is still intact. Amnesty International, for instance, has called Xinjiang the death-penalty capital of the world.
China has also been busy changing Xinjiang's demographics. In his essay "Repression and Revolt in China's Wild West," Joshua Kurlantzick, the foreign editor of New Republic, says, "While Uighurs made up more than 80 percent of Xinjiang's population in 1941, by 1998 they comprised less than 50 percent, and China's 2000 census showed the Han Chinese population growing twice as quickly in Xinjiang as the Uighur population."
It would seem that Washington is now backing off from supporting blanket repression in Xinjiang and Chechnya. Interestingly, as part of its policy to return most of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay to their own countries, the US is making an exception in the case of Uighurs. It is reportedly seeking to find a European country that might accept them.
In other words, the US is not willing to go all the way with China and Russia to make Uighur and Chechnya separatism part of the global terrorism crusade.
For China, therefore, the SCO is an important forum to keep the region stable and the US out. The SCO is a conglomerate of like-minded countries keen to maintain political oligarchies at any cost. For the most part the political remnants of the collapsed Soviet empire still rule these republics. Washington wooed them after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks to smooth military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Some of these regimes were already under attack from their own insurgents. In the US war against terrorism they too were branded terrorists. Which gave despots like Karimov a new lease of life.
At the same time, China and Russia are working on making the SCO a much more tightly knit forum with an interlocking political, economic and security agenda. As the Indian analyst Siddharth Varadarajan points out, "It [the SCO] is the vehicle China favors for elaborating its own strategic vision for the Eurasian landmass."
And this strategic vision is going to clash increasingly with the US, which is keen not only to maintain but expand its foothold in the area. It is a strategically important region not only because of its geography, but as a new source for energy amid dwindling global resources.
But unless the US is prepared to underwrite these repressive regimes in Central Asia, it might find itself severely constrained in maneuvering against China and Russia.
It will find it difficult to do this because of the affront to democracy that these regimes represent. Therefore, Washington will have to up the ante on democratic change and respect for human rights, not only in Central Asia but also within China and Russia.
In other words, the US will find itself increasingly at odds with Russia and China over democratic political change. The latter nations will regard the US call for democracy as a political tactic to entrench and expand US global supremacy. And therein lie the seeds of an ever-increasing strategic rivalry.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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