A report on China's military strength was recently submitted to the legislature by the Ministry of National Defense. As this is a crucial time for cross-strait relations, this report deserves our attention.
Regarding the date of a possible invasion, the report said that prior to 2008, China is likely to use a strategy of military intimidation against Taiwan. After 2008, if there is no upgrading of Taiwan's military strength and a significant imbalance develops, then China is likely to adopt a strategy of de-stroying Taiwan's infrastructure followed by an invasion.
But as far as we can understand, the cause of any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would depend on China's willingness and ability to conduct such a war. As regards its willingness to initiate such a conflict, this is clearly not in accord with China's long-term advantage, nor its goals.
Everyone knows that the goals of China's national development are to maintain a peaceful and stable environment that will allow its economy to continue growing. This is to China's advantage. In this situation, unless Taiwan crosses the "red line," it is highly unlikely that Beijing will initiate a conflict. We have some comments to make regarding the numerous "red lines" that the ministry has adumbrated, which could spark a conflict.
The "red line" encompasses the following conditions: Taiwan declares independence or uses any other method to cut itself off from China; that a foreign power becomes involved; Taiwan rejects negotiations over a long period of time; Taiwan experiences civil unrest; Taiwan develops nuclear weapons capability, makes constitutional amendments pertaining to independence, territorial claims or national status.
A declaration of war is a grave step for a nation and it is unlikely that the Chinese leaders have listed so many specific conditions for going to war, making the world, and even party insiders, wonder why, given these conditions, it has not already gone to war. To do this would simply be to disrupt its own decision-making mechanism.
For example, looking at the condition that a foreign power becomes involved" or that Taiwan rejects negotiations over a long period of time we might well ask what is meant by "involved" and how long is a "long period of time." Involvement of a foreign power was a condition repeatedly emphasized by Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) in the 1980s. At that time, close Sino-US relations caused a cooling in relations between the US and Taiwan, but even though China had little reason for anxiety that the US would become involved in Taiwan it still established this condition as a guarantee.
The current intimacy of the US-Taiwan relationship would quite clearly transgress the 1980s definition of "involvement," so if we regard this as one of China's red lines, then clearly China's leaders have lost the initiative.
As far as ability goes, we believe that China's military would seek to meet three conditions before it initiated a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. First, it would require the ability to swiftly defeat and immobilize Taiwanese forces. Second, it would require a quick victory to prevent complications from changes in domestic and international circumstances and also to control the cost of the conflict. Third, it would require the means to intimidate the US to keep it from becoming involved.
Prior to 2010 it is unlikely that China's military will have the ability to fulfill these conditions, for both Taiwan and the US are not unprepared for this eventuality, and our military strength is constantly improving. If Beijing launched an invasion and failed to achieve its objective, it could expect the following results.
First, it would suffer international economic sanctions:
Even the Tiananmen Incident, which was a relatively minor incident in comparison with a military action that would affect the global strategic environment and the security of regional powers, led to economic sanctions. At the moment, China's commercial relations are not totally harmonious, as can be seen from the 31 cases of mediation that have been submit-ted to the WTO in the few years that China has been a member. As China's economy grows and its demand for resources becomes more insistent, it will feel even greater pressure on the commercial front.
Second, its economic development would go into reverse:
Modern wars are expensive to run, quite apart from the military acquisition and mobilization of troops that would be required before the conflict began. During any such conflict, China's economic infrastructure is bound to suffer significant damage, investment would be cut off, and they might even face economic sanctions or even an embargo. This would be a price that China would have to pay regardless of victory or defeat. Hence the saying that the only thing worse than a battle won is a battle lost. If China lost the war, its economy would suffer even more.
Third, a huge reduction in China's national and military strength: Whether it won or lost, national development would go into reverse and China would suffer as a result. The military losses that China would incur in an invasion of Taiwan would leave it unable to stand up to the US and Japan in the Pacific and its dreams to establish itself as a hegemon in Asia will go up in smoke. If it lost the war, it would no longer be in contention for great power status.
Furthermore, if China loses the war, then leaders may have to step down to take responsibility:
China has no leader of similar stature to Mao Zedong (毛澤東) or Deng, so responsibility for a military defeat cannot be avoided.
Finally, Taiwan's independence:
An invasion would undoubtedly break all negotiations across the Strait and "peaceful unification" would no longer be a possibility. If China lost the war, its economy would immediately go into reverse and its military power would be greatly reduced. As the top leadership fights over control of what is left, it is highly likely that given the bad feeling that exists, Taiwan would then immediately declare independence.
Therefore, although China has been building up its military in recent years, the likelihood of war is still relatively low give the political situation in China and various international factors. Of course this requires that the cross-strait relationship continues to develop.
Taiwan's military should strive towards the goal, long promoted by us, of "strengthening the armed forces, spending efficiently and streamlining personnel." Proposals for the purchase of submarines, anti-submarine aircraft and Patriot missile batteries should also be pushed forward to remedy our weakness against a blockade or a missile strike by China. This is the only way to ensure our safety. The purchase of weapons and unity of purpose is the best way of ensuring peace in the long term.
Bill Chang is former deputy director of the Democratic Progressive Party's Chinese Affairs Department. Lee Wen-chung is a DPP legislator.
TRANSLATED BY Paul Cooper
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