On Monday, the Ministry of Justice announced that it had seized 30 pieces of Taipei City Government property in order to force the city to pay NT$10.8 billion in insurance subsidies it owes the Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI). In response, the city government called on blue-camp politicians to demand a public debate over the subsidy issue with the central government. The city government has turned this simple legal dispute into a political issue.
The dispute over the insurance subsidies involves not only Taipei but also Kaohsiung. The former has sensationalized the whole matter as a case of the central government attempting to "beat Ma" [Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (
The Taipei City Government's main contention is that it's unreasonable for a city of 2.63 million people to pay insurance subsidies for 3.58 million people. Looking at the figures alone, there is clearly room for discussion. But this calculation method is a copy of the labor insurance subsidies, as the city government is responsible for paying insurance subsidies for employees of companies based in Taipei -- whether the employees themselves are registered in Taipei or not. This is the current state of the law and has long been an administrative custom. Even a constitutional interpretation of the law from the Council of Grand Justices may not favor the city government. Despite thus having no legal basis for its refusal, the city government still won't pay its debt. No wonder BNHI officials complain that it's an issue of will, not of law.
The controversy is rooted in the 1999 legislation that transferred the power to levy business taxes from local governments to the central government. This redressed the iniquitous situation in which companies with headquarters registered in Taipei but with factories in other areas would pay business taxes to the Taipei City Government while the pollution created by their factories would affect other regions. This adjustment to the tax system was not carried over to the way national labor and health insurance were calculated. With the tax levy at the local level considerably reduced, it seems unfair that the special municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung have been singled out to carry the burden of labor and health insurance for their residents when all other localities are fully subsidized by the central government.
When the Law Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures was amended, Ma led pan-blue legislators in a move to reject the Cabinet's version. The problem that the city government is facing today has its roots in the amendments that Ma forced through at that time. If Ma believes this is an important issue that needs urgent attention, he should again make use of the pan-blue majority in the legislature and make the necessary amendments. But even if he is able to successfully push them through, the Taipei and Kaohsiung city governments should still pay the money that they currently owe and should not repudiate their liability for the debt. If they do so, this will only worsen the finances of the national health system and create pressure that may result in an increase in premiums.
Yet Taipei is not only reneging on its debts; it is also blaming others. That the Ministry of Justice has seized property to demand payment also seems inappropriate, especially as the property seized includes schools, airports, MRT stations and hospitals.
The central government should not allow the Taipei city government and the BNHI to get into a heated debate over national health insurance premiums. Instead, it should take on the role of a mediator to find a solution that adjusts the tax structure and changes the calculation of premiums to be paid by special municipalities.
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