After several failed attempts at negotiation, the Taiwan Railway Workers Union decided to "take time off to hold meetings." As a member of the public, I am of course displeased with the way this decision infringes on the public's rights and interests. However, a closer look at things reveals that the main factors behind this decision are governmental impotence and short-sightedness.
The Taiwan Railway Administration's (TRA) losses stem from the fact that agency has had to carry the cost for the electrification of the railroad network and continues to carry the cost for railway workers' pension funds on its own. This is unlike the any of the other 10 Key Infrastructure Projects, which were all financed by government or foundations, and that was a policy mistake.
Although the TRA holds many parcels of prime land, it is barred from selling or developing this land, or engaging in other business operations, and the government refuses to lift these restrictions.
The government has long prioritized freeway construction, investing huge amounts of capital and labor. This has placed the private car center stage, leaving public transportation, including the TRA, in a state of disarray. This car-
centered policy creates traffic jams, air pollution and parking-lot shortages, which in the case of the Tahsi City fire unfortunately lead to a situation where rescue routes for firefighters and emergency workers was blocked. Such problems are all related to mistaken and shortsighted traffic policies.
When the government proposed the construction of the high-speed railway using the build-operate- transfer concept, it dealt another blow to the TRA. The government treated the Taiwan High Speed Railway Corp (THSRC) as new and the TRA as old and useless. It was biased towards the THSRC, which eventually led to the demonstrations at Taipei Railway Station over the TRA's decision to lease two platforms and four tracks at that station to the THSRC.
In fact, the length of the platforms and the width of the tracks do not meet the requirements of the high-speed train, and there is not enough room to expand either platforms or tracks. Still, the government insists on transferring these platforms and tracks to the THSRC. This highlights the government's lack of expertise and lack of vision.
Since the high-speed railway is being built, it is the government's duty to provide plans for what the TRA should do, how the two rail agencies should co-exist and prosper and how they could help each other. After 10 years, however, there is no concrete government plan, but only the empty phrase "creating rapid transportation."
A careful look at the TRA's situation shows that the commuters who make up three-quarters of all of its passengers only produce one-quarter of revenues, while the one-quarter of passengers who are long-distance travellers produce three-quarters of the revenues. Serving only commuters is, therefore, a dead-end street for the agency. In the end there will be no alternative to massive staff reductions.
If the TRA is privatized, there will be nothing to guarantee the employees' right to a job. The government should respond to this situation as soon as possible by directing and planning for diversified operations for the agency.
First and most importantly, it should direct specialized railway personnel towards the high-speed railway, thus killing two birds with one stone.
Second, it should develop tourist railways by improving the Chichi line, restarting the old mountain line and the Tung Kang line and extending the Kenting line.
Third, it should strive to win over people in places not served by the high-speed railway, such as Fengyuan, Tachia, Touliu and Ershui.
Fourth, the CKS International Airport line should be operated by the TRA.
Fifth, the Eastern Railway Line should be guaranteed and the construction of the Suao-Hualien highway delayed.
These steps would allow the agencies to continue to develop. It also complies with plans to double tourism and guarantees the public's right to travel. So why not do it? The government's foot-dragging once again spotlights its impotence and lack of vision.
There are many problems with the TRA's operations. It is definitely not beyond hope, but that has nothing to do with privatizing the agency. Someone may say that many other state-run enterprises have been privatized, so why not the TRA? However, other state-run enterprises have merely been privatized, and they have not had to compete with a company that will monopolize a whole market as the THSRC will.
The TRA can therefore not be compared to other privatized companies. When Taiwan Motor
Transport Co, the state-owned long-distance bus operator, was being privatized, officials thumped their chests saying that employees' rights would be guaranteed. But could the employees fill their stomachs on these government guarantees when Taiwan Motor went belly-up?
If the government had planned for and helped the TRA become self-sufficient when the construction of the high-speed railway began so that the agency would have been prepared for the arrival of the high-speed railway, the current turbulence would never have occurred. The government's inability to provide the TRA with a guiding vision and to solve its urgent problems has created the current situation.
The government must admit its responsibility for these failures of leadership. If it is able to take this experience to heart and humbly accept the advice of able people outside of government, it is not too late to remedy the situation.
If it continues to mishandle things, however, I'm afraid that it is the government officials that will have to take to the streets to save themselves.
Hsu Nai-yi is president of the Railway Cultural Society.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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