For a long time, the people of Hong Kong had been regarded as interested only in the economy, since they showed relatively little interest in political activities. Apart the election held right before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997, there was virtually no attempt by the people to have a say in their political future. But their performance since July 1 has been most refreshing. Their passion for political participation has apparently come alive overnight. Why? The reason lies in the legislative implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which would severely curtail people's freedoms, democracy and human rights and cause a great deal of uncertainty about the future.
The handover of Hong Kong to China was settled through direct negotiations between China and the UK. The people of Hong Kong had absolutely no say in this process. It was not until the term of the last British governor, Chris Patten, that structural reforms were made to allow for popular elections. However, China accused Britain of breaching the Sino-UK pact by enacting the reforms and promised to reverse them after the 1997 handover. But in the process of rolling back the democratic reforms, the foundations of Hong Kong's current problems were laid.
Everyone knows that in the six short years since the handover, Hong Kong's allure as the "Pearl of Orient" has dimmed. In the minds of China's leaders, it had long been decided that Shanghai was to replace Hong Kong as the country's economic powerhouse. Now the majority of Chinese capital is channeled into developing Shanghai.
The situation in Hong Kong has completely changed. Real estate prices have fallen by 60 to 70 percent since the handover. The manufacturing sector quickly moved north, causing the unemployment rate to soar to 8 percent. Against the backdrop of serious economic decline, the Special Administrative Region (SAR) government nevertheless had to follow Beijing's demands for the legislative implementation of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which seeks to strip the people of their freedoms, democracy and human rights. It isn't hard to see why this move generated resentment among the people.
The people of Hong Kong know very well that enactment of the so-called anti-subversion bill, regardless of how much the SAR government water it down, will only aggravate Hong Kong's problems, and they would have no chance to undo the damage in the future.
As a result, as many as 500,000 people turned out to demonstrate on July 1. Even the Beijing leadership was taken aback. On July 9, another 50,000 people besieged the Legislative Council, demanding popular election of the SAR government. On July 13, 20,000 people took to the streets to demand a timetable for democratic reforms, so that the third chief executive of the SAR government and the Legislative Council would be elected by popular elections in 2007 and 2008. This series of protests clearly did not occur arbitrarily or randomly.
These demands are very important in the protection of human rights. According to the current election system, the chief executive is elected by a committee of 800 members, all hand-picked by Beijing. At most, half of the members of the legislature are elected by the public. Furthermore, any amendments to the way the chief executive and the legislature are elected can only take place after 2007, and then only with the approval of at least two-thirds of the legislature, the chief executive and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Bluntly put, how much democracy Hong Kong can enjoy in the future is entirely up to Beijing. To avoid the development of a democracy movement in China, Beijing would of course prefer democracy in Hong Kong to materialize later rather than sooner.
What will become of the Hong Kong public's demand for greater democracy? Only time will tell. However, the experience of Hong Kong has taught Taiwan a very important lesson: the true nature of the so-called "one country, two systems" model.
The people of Hong Kong have now finally realized that, as a result of their failure to stand up for their rights before the 1997 handover, they must now pay an even greater price for these rights. Those who passionately welcomed the handover because of the Beijing-orchestrated stock and real-estate market boom that came with it, were deluding themselves about the future of Hong Kong.
After the controversies surrounding Article 23, the people of Taiwan have become even less interested in "one country, two systems." But it is not just this flawed model that people should be wary of. China also creates a mirage of prosperity to lure investment across the Taiwan Strait. As well as pressing for the relaxation of rules on investing in China, some people even claim that these investments can revive Taiwan's economy. This will only allow China to repeat the trick it played in the handover of Hong Kong.
Taiwan is a democratic country. People here of course feel great respect for the democratic movements in Hong Kong. However, the status of Taiwan and that of Hong Kong should not be compared. People should avoid becoming entranced by "Greater China" nationalism, which would only further complicate the cross-strait relationship. Look at Hong Kong and then think about Taiwan. The more than 23 million people here must unite in their fight to defend the sovereignty of Taiwan, and to always follow the "Taiwan First" principle, not just in terms of national identification but also in attempts to revive economy. While the demands of the Hong Kong people for democracy deserve recognition, their rights would not be under threat now had they shown an interest in them before 1997.
In the past half century, people here have enjoyed prosperous and stable lives. Some believe that this will continue, and have therefore lost their drive to work hard, causing Taiwan's economy to lose much of its momentum. Worse yet, some people believe that since things are not looking as good as before, and with the Chinese economy growing rapidly, Taiwanese capital can make the greatest gains by being invested in China. Such thinking could be lethal to Taiwan. If this mentality continues to permeate society, even if Taiwan rejects the "one country, two systems," it will be unable to avoid falling into another Chinese trap.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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