Minister of Economic Affairs-designate Lin Hsin-yi
The ministry said that it was almost impossible at this point to find an alternative to the nuclear power plant. And even though the ministry's Energy Commission (
Is it true there are no alternatives to the nuclear power plant as the ministry suggests? Will Taiwan suffer power shortages if the plant is not built? No and no. A report issued by Taipower in April says that Taiwan's excess power capacity in Taiwan will hit 19.4 percent and 22.8 percent in July 2003 and July 2004 respectively, after the plant's two nuclear reactors go online. The same report also states that if the plant is not constructed, then Taiwan's power capacity will drop to 15.5 percent and 15.4 percent for the same time periods.
Illustration: Yu Sha
Japan's excess capacity has been less than 13 percent since 1983 and even dipped below 5 percent in 1990. Yet Japan's power grid has not tripped as many times as Taiwan's has. Even without the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, Taiwan still has a higher ratio of excess capacity than Japan. Where is the shortage that Taipower complains of? If there are shortages, their source lies with Taiwan's system of power distribution, not a lack of power.
Everybody knows that there are numerous ways to generate electricity, including hydropower, thermal power (coal, oil and natural gas power plants), nuclear power, solar power, wind power, etc. Taiwan's present power supply would be more than sufficient if the money spent on building the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant were spent constructing other types of power generating plants or raising Taiwan's electricity efficiency. There are a variety of alternatives that Taiwan could pursue in addition to nuclear power. These include:
1) Co-generation systems: Combined-cycle gas turbine plants in Taiwan accounted for 2,652 megawatts of capacity in 1997. This method of power generation was not considered when the government began planning the construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, but could be a feasible alternative to the plant (with a capacity of 2,700 megawatts). According to estimates by the Energy Commission, Taiwan's co-generation power capacity could grow to 6,360 megawatts by 2020.
2) Raise the efficiency of power generation and reduce energy use: OECD countries reduced their oil consumption used in power generation by 15 percent between 1973 and 1985, yet their GDP still increased by 20 percent during the same period. In California, the government subsidizes consumers if they install power-saving equipment (including power-saving lights, etc). If Taiwan could raise energy efficiency by 20 percent, bringing it to OECD levels (but still lower than levels in Japan), then 3,700 megawatts could be shaved off the peak that Taiwan hit in 1997 of 22,237 megawatts. 3,700 megawatts is 1,000 megawatts more than the power generating capacity of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.
3) Alter Taiwan's industrial structure: Petrochemicals, steel, cement, paper and other power-consuming industries accounted for 7 percent of Taiwan's GDP over the past seven years, but consumed more than one-third of Taiwan's power. If the ratio of power hungry industries in Taiwan was lowered and energy efficiency was raised 20 percent, it would save another 3,700 megawatts.
4) Expand natural gas power generators: According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), energy generated by natural gas will increase in member countries from 12.9 percent in 1995 to 19.6 percent in 2005. The ratio of nuclear-generated power will decrease in the countries during the same period. If Taiwan's energy generating capacity follows the plan of the Energy Commission put forth in a proposal passed in 1998, then power generated by natural gas would increase from 3,483 megawatts in 1997 to 20,148 megawatts by 2020, an addition of 16,710 megawatts. This would be more than enough to compensate for the loss in electricity capacity if the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant were scrapped.
5) Promote renewable energy resources: Solar, wind, tidal and other renewable energy sources fit perfectly with Taiwan's trend toward sustainable development. Wind-generated power has grown exponentially over the past decade. In Germany, wind generated 1.7 trillion kilowatt-hours of power in 1995, enough to supply the lighting needs of 4.7 million households for the entire year. Denmark further plans to supply 50 percent of its power needs by wind power by the year 2030 and France plans to boost its wind generating capacity to 500 trillion watts within 10 years. Taiwan has ample resources to develop wind power. Coastal regions in central and southern Taiwan as well as outlying islands are suitable locations to construct power-generating windmills. Taiwan also could greatly increase the ratio of energy from solar power.
6) Liberalization of the power industry: Taiwan's power needs could easily be met if Taiwan completely liberalized its power industry, allowed private operators to build and operate power stations and distribute and sell power, and if efficient regional power grids were built. The quota for the initial phase of the liberalization plan (1997 to 2002) was only 7.26 million kilowatts, 20 percent of Taipower's capacity. However, by 1995, 12 private conglomerates had submitted 23 applications, totaling 1.5 times the capacity quota.
Are Taipower and the Energy Commission ignorant of the great variety of alternatives to the nuclear power station that exist, or are they just incompetent?
Wang To-far (王塗發) heads the department of economics at National Chung Hsing University and is chairman of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union.
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