Arrogance, an unpopular government and the inability of politicians to respond to the anxieties of a large segment of the population were among the reasons French voters soundly rejected the EU constitutional treaty in Sunday's referendum.
President Jacques Chirac, Socialist Party head Francois Hollande and other mainstream supporters of the treaty awoke too late to the sea change that was taking place among the French regarding the treaty, and even after recognizing a problem failed to understand the challenge.
Polls showed support for the constitution at more than 60 percent until mid-March, when European Commission President Jose Luis Barroso made a point of defending the union's determination to liberalize Europe's services sector.
French workers suddenly began to fear that they could be competing for domestic jobs with Polish and Czech craftsmen -- working for Polish and Czech wages and Polish and Czech social security benefits.
These fears took on flesh when a small French company laid off nine of its workers but said they could keep their jobs if they worked for the firm's subsidiary in Romania, at 110 euros (US$138) a month, or one-10th of their past salaries.
A few weeks later, French media revealed that a sub-contractor of the state-owned telecommunications giant France Telecom had hired some 100 Portuguese workers to work in France at Portuguese wages.
These events seemed to confirm the warnings of treaty opponents that the constitution was a Trojan Horse for free-market and business interests seeking to lower wages and erode France's generous social-welfare system.
By the time Chirac finally managed to convince Brussels to drop the so-called Bolkestein directive on services, the damage had been done, with poll after poll showing that French sentiment had turned against the EU constitution.
Yet, even in the two months of campaigning that followed, Chirac and other treaty proponents failed to address the issue except in vague terms. Instead, they continued to sell the political benefits of the constitution as well as the historic responsibility of the French.
These arguments appealed to white-collar workers, entrepreneurs and urban residents, who were already supporters of the treaty, but failed to sway the blue-collar workers, farmers and left-wing voters who held the key to the referendum's success or failure.
According to estimates based on exit polls, some 80 percent of blue-collar workers voted against the treaty. More than 60 percent of those under 25 rejected the constitution, France 2 television said.
With unemployment at a five-year high and the long-promised economic turnaround still seemingly far off, those who felt particularly threatened by change sought to protect themselves and to send the government a clear message.
Chirac too easily dismissed this part of the electorate as disloyal and, in a nationally televised appearance in May, criticized its adherents as being un-European, which proved to be a serious error in tactical judgement.
"It was a mistake to say, `You cannot be European and vote no,'" the head of a French polling institute said, "because this showed that Chirac did not at all understand a segment of society."
When the French president finally made a point of addressing these issues, in a nationally televised speech three days before the referendum, it was too late.
Chirac also made a fatal error in underestimating the deep disaffection in France for him, his prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and the policies of his government.
In what many of his own advisors criticized as an act of misplaced loyalty, he kept Raffarin at his post despite the prime minister's many gaffes and deep unpopularity.
Raffarin also proved to be a spectacularly ineffectual spokesman for the treaty, at one point declaring, "The only good `no' is a non-voting `no,'" an unhappy paraphrase of a quote by a 19th-century American general, who had said, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian."
Chirac advisors said bitterly that this was the first time in French history that a prime minister actually called on people to stay away from the polls.
In addition, Chirac and other treaty proponents spun doomsday scenarios in case of a treaty rejection that were too melodramatic to be taken seriously.
Here, too, Raffarin had an unhappy touch when he warned, just 10 days before the vote, that rejection of the constitution would usher in an economic crisis.
"To hear that is seen as blackmail and has no basis in reality," an advisor to Chirac told the daily Le Monde. "The economic crisis has been here for quite some time."
An advisor to the government, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the problem with Chirac's campaign for the treaty was that it sought "to destroy the no, rather than construct the yes."
Finally, the absence of a real debate on the treaty until it became clear that it could be rejected made it appear as if leaders in Paris and Brussels were simply imposing the constitution and were expecting the usual rubber-stamp approval by voters.
In that regard, this stinging rejection of the EU constitution should serve as a memorable lesson for European politicians.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval