China's spur-of-the-moment decision to cancel a meeting between Vice Premier Wu Yi (
Hu had previously pointed out that Koizumi's Yasukuni visits, Japan's whitewash of wartime atrocities in school textbooks and Taiwan were the three main problems in the Sino-Japanese relationship. In part, this statement was a warning that this relationship could collapse at any time, and the last minute cancellation of the Wu-Koizumi meeting was a way for China to issue a protest and a further warning.
Beijing has placed the blame for increased Sino-Japanese tensions on Koizumi, pointing specifically to the announcement of the Sino-US joint security agreement in February that made the Taiwan Strait a "common security objective;" Japan's Ministry of Education's approval last month of textbooks that whitewashed events during World War II; Koizumi's insistence last week that his visits to the Yasukuni shrine were not the business of other countries; and the subsequent announcement that 18 Japanese had their household registration transferred to the disputed Diaoyutai islands.
In addition, there were anti-Japanese protests in more than 10 Chinese cities last month which caused damage to the Japanese embassy and Japanese businesses in China. Beijing eventually suppressed these demonstrations, but the political repercussions were such that Hu decided to put off reconstructing high-level relations with Japan. As a result, relations between the two countries remain strained.
These events are a result of Hu's new foreign-affairs policy, which has all the characteristics and methods of great-power diplomacy. Simply put, Beijing's great-power diplomacy and regional policies are no longer about tailoring the international situation to benefit its domestic situation. Instead, China is acting in a way characteristic of a major power with a decisive influence on regional affairs. As China's foreign policy matures and its policy options increase, its foreign policy -- including its policy on Taiwan -- will become more active. It is in this context that Hu's policy of combining blandishments and threats as a tool of diplomacy is taking shape.
In the face of China's rising, Japanese policy has to act as a counterbalance, which it has done through enhanced cooperation with the US in military matters and in seeking a position on the UN Security Council. It also hopes to establish a free-trade area with Southeast Asia and has said "no" to Beijing's attempts to interfere with its domestic affairs.
South Korea, on the other hand, has adopted a policy of cozying up to China in the hope of becoming its bridge into northeast Asia and a stabilizing force against the North Korean threat. Nevertheless, the government in Seoul has also maintained its special military relationship with the US.
The countries of Southeast Asia have taken a soft line with China, working towards the creation of a free-trade area with ASEAN and a code of conduct for the South China Sea, but at the same time hoping that India and the US can serve as a counter-balance to China in the political and military arenas.
As for the US-China relationship, it has never been so complex. The North Korean nuclear issue, on which China and the US had cooperated, is now a source of growing tension, and the US-Japanese security agreements have highlighted the fact that the US has adopted a defensive posture toward China and intends to keep it in line.
On the commercial front, the controversy over textile quotas has reached the intensity of a trade war, but this also underlines increased mutual dependence.
Superficially, it would seem that the problem between China and Japan is one of history, but at a deeper level, it is a tug-of-war between two regional powers. There is rapidly rising China, and then there is Japan, which wants to normalize its status as a great power. It is no surprise, therefore, that the two countries have clashed over history, access to energy supplies and territory. But as trade relations between China and Japan are also growing, it is likely that these diplomatic tussles will remain firmly in the political arena. By canceling the meeting with Koizumi, Hu is making clear that Beijing is still taking a hard line with Japan, but this is still a far cry from laying down an ultimatum.
Koizumi clearly will not stop his Yasukuni visits as a result of China's actions, but the way he goes about the visits and the sentiments he expresses may change. The political tussles have intensified nationalist sentiment, and this has limited the space for the leadership in both countries to maneuver.
Philip Yang is a professor of political science at the National Taiwan University.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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