Despite all the heated discussions ahead of the next round of nuclear talks with the big three EU powers, Tehran realistically has only two options.
One is to insist further on resuming the partial nuclear enrichment process in the Isfahan plant in central Iran against international consensus.
This option risks not only being referred to the UN Security Council but also the same political isolation as the country experienced in the first decade after the 1979 Islamic revolution.
The other option is to acquiesce to the demand from Britain, France and Germany and extend the suspension of the nuclear enrichment program for the time being.
The second option risks losing face and national pride at home after having proclaimed numerous deadlines and ultimatums.
"The Europeans should no longer fool us with their delay tactics, and we should realize that their main aim is just to make us stop our nuclear activities which is simply unacceptable," conservative lawmaker Kazem Jalali said.
The conservative majority in the Iranian parliament took the initiative last week and approved a bill forcing the government to resume the enrichment process despite stern warnings from the three EU powers.
"We highly welcome the parliamentary move and are ready to resume enrichment in Isfahan as soon as a final political decision is made," Iranian Atomic Energy Organization deputy Mohammad Saaidi said.
The scheduled meeting between the three EU foreign ministers on Tuesday and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani is widely expected by Iranian officials to achieve no clear breakthrough.
"The preparatory talks have so far been extremely difficult with both sides decisively stressing their positions," nuclear delegation spokesman Hussein Mussavian said.
Mussavian did not rule out a cancellation of the meeting if no agreement was reached at the expert level prior to the main meeting.
Rowhani, who is also Iran's National Security Council secretary, himself sees "little chance" of finding a settlement in what he terms the "last chance" for the EU.
"Our stance is clear: we will be willing to continue the talks with the Europeans even on a long-term basis, but only if we get simultaneously the acknowledgement of partial resumption of uranium enrichment," Rowhani said.
Iran has branded as insufficient the incentives so far offered in return for dropping its nuclear program. The incentives include membership of the WTO and the lifting of sanctions on civil aviation spare parts.
Iran has played down the threat of a referral to the UN Security Council, saying that its demand to have peaceful nuclear activities is in line with the UN's non-proliferation treaty.
The nuclear program can neither be legally challenged nor punished with sanctions by the world body, Iran believes.
But despite the intensive pressure by conservative hardliners to end the EU talks and resume enrichment unilaterally, observers still doubt that Iranian leaders would be willing to turn the country into a second North Korea.
"We have no intention to cut talks with the EU and will still try to find a suitable bilateral settlement but expect our European friends not to give in to any political pressure," President Mohammad Khatami said in a reference to alleged US pressure on the EU not to allow any nuclear activity in Iran.
Also, Khatami's probable successor, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, has already announced that the solution to the dispute should be based on "wisdom, patience and logic."
Rafsanjani warned against hasty decisions which could damage the country.
"At least since Khatami's presidency, Iran has exposed itself as a democratic state in the Middle East even capable of intervening between Islamic and western civilizations," one European diplomat in Teheran said.
"Any decision making the country return into isolation would neutralize all efforts in the last eight years," the diplomat said.
Observers expect that the most probable outcome of next week's talks will be another temporary extension of Iran's enrichment program suspension.
The decision would allow the European powers to transfer the whole nuclear discussion to the next Iranian government, most probably led by the pragmatic Rafsanjani.
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