Nearly all the world's nations are meeting in New York to review the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was negotiated in the 1960s after five countries (the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China) developed nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty and, over time, constructed their own atomic bombs. Now North Korea and Iran stand accused of violating their treaty commitments by pursuing nuclear weapons.
Aside from the legal issues, is there a moral case for non-proliferation? In a world of sovereign states, is it hypocritical for some to have nuclear weapons and deny them to others?
If no one had the bomb today, it would be best if it were not invented. But history depends on the paths that were taken in the past. Suppose it were 1939, and states were debating whether the US should invent the bomb. They might have argued that all should get it or none. But if they knew that Hitler's Germany would get it, they might have approved Franklin Roosevelt's decision to develop it before the Nazis.
Besides, turning back the clock is impossible. Even if all countries agree to disarm, some might cheat. The successful cheaters would most likely be authoritarian states with little transparency. After all, North Korea says that it has developed nuclear weapons despite having signed the NPT. Libya was also a party to the NPT while it pursued a covert nuclear program.
If one regards impartiality and attention to consequences as essential to morality, one could imagine countries accepting the morality of unequal possession of nuclear weapons if certain conditions were met. For example, the purposes should be limited to self-defense. States possessing weapons should take special steps to reduce the prospect of their use. The weapons should be used to help preserve the independence of all states, rather than for imperial aggrandizement, and steps should be taken to reduce arsenals as political conditions permit. Today's NPT comes close to reflecting such conditions.
Of course, the NPT does not rest solely on moral arguments, but primarily on self-interest and prudence. Most states adhere because they believe that their security would be diminished if more states obtained nuclear weapons. The treaty helps them to reduce fears of cheating by neighbors because it provides for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The credibility of US security guarantees for its allies is one of the reasons that the bomb did not spread to 25 countries within a decade, as President John F. Kennedy once expected.
Non-proliferation is not hypocritical if it is based on an impartial and realistic estimation of risks. But if a state like North Korea or Iran decides to accept such risks, should that be purely its own choice?
Perhaps, if the risks were borne solely by its own people, but they are not. Third parties are justified in rejecting the risks that would be imposed upon them. The history of proliferation shows that political chain reactions often occur -- witness China, India and Pakistan -- and there are real fears that North Korea and Iran might trigger such chains in Northeast Asia and the Middle East.
Some people argue that nuclear proliferation will actually reduce risks. Call it the "porcupine theory." In such a prickly world, no country would dare aggression. But this assumes perfect rationality. In the real world, accidents occur, so more proliferation means a greater chance of eventual inadvertent use, weaker capacity in managing nuclear crises, and greater difficulty in establishing controls and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics.
In addition, the more states possess nuclear weapons, the greater the prospects that terrorists will gain access to them. Of course, transnational terrorists usually have no "return address" that allows the threat of mutual deterrence to work, but North Korea or Iran has no moral right to impose this risk upon others.
Three EU countries -- the UK, France and Germany -- are trying to persuade Iran to give up its nuclear enrichment program, which would give it bomb material to use after a quick withdrawal from the treaty. Iran claims a right to enrichment under Article 4 of the NPT, but that article has to be read in light of the other articles and of Iran's past deception vis-vis the IAEA.
In East Asia, North Korea withdrew from the NPT after using it to disguise its weapons program, and China, the US, Japan, Russia and South Korea are trying to persuade Kim Jong-il's regime to reverse course.
It seems right for these states to use pressure to dissuade Iran and North Korea from imposing new risks on the world. But the existing nuclear weapons states also must be mindful of the moral conditions that underlie the NPT bargain. The obligation under Article 6 to reduce arsenals cannot be interpreted to require prompt disarmament unless that would enhance stability. Such conditions do not yet exist in a world where undemocratic states cheat on legal obligations. But the nuclear weapons states should continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and refrain from new programs that suggest the prospect of their use.
Given the dangers that increased risks imply for everyone, there is a strong moral case for a policy of stopping further proliferation rather than arguing that Iran or North Korea have a right to do whatever they wish as sovereign states. But it is also important to remember that obligations of non-proliferation bind nuclear weapons states as well.
Joseph Nye, a former assistant US secretary of defense and director of the National Intelligence Council, is a professor at Harvard University and author of Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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