As a student in international politics, I am extremely annoyed and bothered by recent developments in cross-strait relations. China fever seems to dominate newspaper and TV-news coverage. What particularly annoys me is the numbing of public opinion and the media's response to the trips to China by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
As I condemn EU attempts to lift the arms embargo and try to convince Europeans that our country is under serious threat, our opposition parties continue to stall arms procurements in the Legislative Yuan.
As I argue for the right of self-determination, my fellow Taiwanese seem to be throwing their support behind Lien and Soong's denunciation of this right by excluding independence as an option for our future.
What the heck are they doing, one of my friends from Germany asked? I could not say a word but smiled bitterly at him and replied, "I don't know."
Now I want to ask this: What do we want? Why should we go down on our knees and beg for the chance to reconcile with people who are slapping our faces?
Recent developments in Taiwan have been among the most confusing in international politics. No one seems to know what Taiwan wants except for these crafty politicians.
As an article published in the Economist states, "Taiwan itself is curiously ambivalent about China's growing military prowess. The purchase of new weapons from America has become bogged down in fierce political debate on the island, with many arguing that they are too expensive, will take too long to acquire and integrate into the Taiwanese military, or will simply fuel an arms race with the mainland."
It seems to me that others worry and see the dangers much more clearly than we do. I am neither a supporter of confrontation nor a supporter of bellicose behavior, but what I do support is Taiwanese making decisions out of our own free will. Every option should be open to the Taiwanese people. We should not give up our choices simply because China forbids them.
I am standing humbly at the crossroads as most Taiwanese apparently pay tribute to Lien and Soong for what they have done in China. If that's the decision of the people, then I will defend our stance as I always do. But if this is the outcome of manipulation by crafty politicians or political bait thrown out by the Chinese, then I urge the Taiwanese to open their eyes and recognize the danger beneath it all. Eventually it is us who will suffer or benefit from the decisions we make.
What should or shouldn't be our options must be decided by the 23 million people on our mother island, not someone in Beijing who cares nothing about our lives and dignity. I say the only option we shouldn't have is abandoning Taiwan's future.
Chun-Lin daniel
England
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