The communique issued after the meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) says that the two parties have reached an agreement to set up a mutual-trust mechanism for cross-strait military issues, and President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has been in a hurry to call for its early establishment. Although the concept of a mutual-trust mechanism was first broached by Chen, there is no need for him to rush to share the credit with Lien. Unless he has changed his cross-strait position to one that is in line with Lien's, he will get no credit.
In fact, as the government is beginning to advocate the establishment of such a mechanism, I say that it is unrealistic. When Beijing said on May 17 last year that it was ready to consider such a move, I said that it was a castle in the clouds. The fact that political leaders on each side of the Taiwan Strait continue to laud this goal cannot make me change my opinion.
Setting up a mutual-trust mechanism for military issues requires a platform for communication that would allow the counterpart to obtain military information to avoid having negotiations bring us to the brink of war, all in order to maintain peace. This is a good system, but there are conditions attached to it.
The serious situation during the Cold War led the Soviet Union lacking in confidence, to first advocate the establishment of such a mechanism in 1950. In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the US, Canada and 35 European nations, became the most important platform for communication and mutual-trust during the Cold War, and it remained so until 1989.
According to the Helsinki Final Act (Aug. 1, 1975), the foundations for the mutual-trust mechanism were: One, sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty. Two, refraining from the threat or use of force. Three, inviolability of frontiers. Four, territorial integrity of states. Five, peaceful settlement of disputes. Six, non-intervention in internal affairs. Seven, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. Eight, equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Nine, cooperation among states. Ten, fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.
Some of these points are a matter of political rhetoric, eg, human rights, cooperation and so on. The core is the inviolability of sovereignty and territory, which could be called the premise for the mechanism as well as its goal. Mutual military trust was the tool.
Moreover, military mutual-trust mechanisms are only effective in keeping the peace when both sides have military parity, so that retribution can be extracted for violation of the terms of the mechanism. Only then is it possible to ensure that the other side will adhere to the terms of the mechanism. This has been the case between the US and the Soviet Union, North and South Korea, and India and Pakistan. The fact that China has seen fit to establish such mechanisms with smaller neighbors is largely because involvement by these states in China's minority communities could have serious consequences, and the mechanism can help to disentangle complex border issues.
To put it another way, the question of territorial inviolability is the premise for such mutual-trust mechanisms. It is also their purpose. The mechanism is a tool, and its effectiveness is guaranteed by a balance of power.
At the moment, Chen is enamored by the peace that a military mutual-trust mechanism might bring, but he has ignored the fact that China does not accept the Democratic Progressive Party's stance on Taiwan's sovereignty.
In his talks with Hu, Lien abandoned the strategy of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," recognized in the so-called "1992 consensus," and in all formal meetings with Chinese officials avoided any mention of the Republic of China (ROC). This is tantamount to a tacit acceptance of Beijing's line. It is only because of this, and the fact that both China and the KMT both oppose Taiwan's independence that Beijing has been able to accept the idea of "negotiations" over "mutual-trust mechanisms."
China fully understands the significance of such mechanisms in the international community. It has laid the groundwork for dealing with possible negotiations in its "Anti-Secession" Law, which states that such a mechanism can only be established on the basis of an acceptance of "one China," and the acknowledgement that the ultimate goal of cross-strait relations is unification.
Lien has taken the first steps toward having such a mechanism accepted under the terms of the Anti-Secession Law. How does such a mechanism -- built on the basis of "one China" and ultimate unification -- differ from the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, which preceded Beijing's abolition of the Tibetan government and the creation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region?
When you abandon the principle of sovereignty, and also do not have the strength to protect yourself, then the results are perfectly clear. There is clearly no need for Chen to fight for credit with Lien for establishing this kind of mutual-trust mechanism.
Even if Taiwan had not rescinded the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, redeployed its forces in a more hostile posture and its planes continued to transgress the center line of the Taiwan Strait, none of these actions would threaten China's sovereignty in the least. There's really no need for Beijing to establish a military mutual-trust mechanism with Taipei. China is simply playing on Taiwan's naivete, offering a hollow prize in exchange for concessions over Taiwan's sovereignty.
For China, there is no down side to this deal. It is unfortunate that Taiwan's politicians are excited about promoting this initiative. They're simply showing off their incompetence.
Lin Cho-shui is a DPP legislator.
Translated by Perry Svensson and Ian Bartholomew
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