Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and his gang started the journey to China as if they were a group of homesick travelers returning to the embrace of the motherland. The closer they got to Beijing and to Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), the more excited they got. At Peking University, a thrilled Lien declared: "I am very happy that at this moment of changing history, I got onto this bus." Lien said his trip to China was propelled by the backing of strong popular will. Actually, not only do most people in Taiwan not only not identify with Lien's behavior, they also believe it was shameful the way he is selling out Taiwan.
Many people see Lien as someone who has been rejected in the last two presidential elections and as someone who was hoping to stage a political comeback with his trip.
In Taiwan, Lien loudly proclaims the need to defend the "Republic of China" (ROC) and stand by the so-called "1992 consensus," under which each side of the Taiwan Strait was supposedly free to have its own interpretation of "one China." If he was speaking from his heart, then he should have been consistent in his language. But in China, he never spoke one word about the ROC's sovereignty. He did say that the "Republic of China was the first democratic republic in Asia," but making it sound like something from the past, not the present.
Does the "Republic of China" exist any longer? Lien didn't dare say so under the roof of the motherland. Instead, he reiterated the supposed dying words of Sun Yat-sen (孫中山): "save China through peaceful endeavors." What rambling nonsense by a politician with confused national identity.
It was laughable that in his speech at Peking University, Lien called that school and National Taiwan University the fortresses and front guards of liberalism. Lien only dared to criticize the government run by China's northern warlords during the early years of the ROC, saying "China did not offer an environment for liberalism, and so [it spread] only on school campuses at the time." He probably did not know that when the KMT ruled China, liberalism had even less breathing space. Several academics who supported liberalism were assassinated, so liberalism could not even exist on school campuses.
After the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, all intellectuals, not just advocates of liberalism, were oppressed. Some died in the endless waves of political struggle campaigns and some were politically "reformed." The oppression of liberalism was a common tactic of the governments run by the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), highlighting their "brotherhood" and "common heart."
But why did Lien praise Peking University's campus liberalism, yet fail to mention the liberalism permeating every street corner in Taiwan? He didn't just conveniently forget to mention Taiwan's liberties and freedoms -- he criticized its democracy, or rather what he said was the lack of democracy in this country.
Lien praised the Chinese government for a grassroots election system, despite the fact that the system has been tried on an extremely limited basis and then sporadically. Yet he complained that populism had replaced democracy in Taiwan. Perhaps he thinks village chief elections in China are better than presidential elections in Taiwan. Lien's know-ledge and insight into political science is very impressive; of course he does have a doctorate in it.
On the other hand, he boasted that the KMT won last year's legislative election. Is this what he meant by the victory of populism? Have all the elections in which he suffered defeat, including the last two presidential elections, exemplified sinful populism? Did only those elections in which the KMT enjoyed victories demonstrate true democracy? Thank goodness he did not win the presidency.
Lien reiterated the so-called "1992 consensus," which is by itself not a surprise since this has been his consistent stance. The strange thing is that while he repeatedly talked about "one China, with each side free to make its own interpretation," he never bothered to state what the KMT's interpretation of "one China" was. The KMT has long held that "one China" is the "sovereign state of the Republic of China." However, in front of Hu, Lien was as meek as a lamb and just could not say the words. He who vowed to defend the ROC's sovereignty suddenly decided that sovereignty had vanished from the face of the earth as soon as he arrived in China.
He even stressed that to "take the right path" is to "identify with this country." Isn't this a declaration of the end of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT and the end of the ROC? The basis of the consensus between Hu and Lien was essentially to accept "one China" and betray Taiwan. No wonder they lamented they had not met earlier.
Let's review what Lien managed to win for Taiwan on his trip. The first point of the communique between Lien and Hu is Beijing's long-standing precondition for any cross-strait negotiations -- the so-called "1992 consensus." So what Lien managed to score for Taiwan was an acceptance of "one China" and an opportunity for Taiwan to surrender to Beijing.
Point two was that after Taiwan accepts the so-called "1992 consensus" under which it is a mere Chinese province, then the state of war between the two sides can end and a peace treaty may be signed.
Point three was that so long as Taiwan surrenders this way, there may be direct links, reinforcement of cross-strait economic exchanges and room for negotiations over cross-strait common market, so that Taiwanese capital and technology may flow into China at an even faster pace. So basically that means handing over the blood of Taiwan's economic survival on a silver platter.
Point four was that after the two sides resume negotiations, Beijing may "allow" Taiwan to participate in some international organizations or events under the "1992 consensus."
The fifth point, to establish a platform for periodic communication between the CCP and the KMT, simply confirms the KMT is joining forces with Beijing to sell out Taiwan.
This is Lien's idea of "save China through peaceful endeavors." From the 10-point consensus between Beijing and KMT Vice Chairman Chiang Pin-kun (江丙坤) to the Hu-Lien agreement, everything is in China's favor. These pacts only damage Taiwan's sovereignty, would drain Taiwan's economy and worsen the unemployment and crime problems in this country.
Lien went to China on what he called a "journey of peace," saying he would help Taiwan counter the negative implications of Beijing's "Anti-Secession" Law. Yet China responded with the same old pro-unification tune. Lien worked so hard, yet still played Hu's fool. There was really no need for Lien to go through all that trouble when any other person could have gotten the same results.
It was too much to hope that Lien would stand up for this country's interests. However, it was still a little shocking the way that he tried to sell out the ROC along with Taiwan. The biggest presents that Lien wanted to give his "motherland" was not anything tangible but an acknowledgement of the end of the ROC and a denial of Taiwan's sovereignty, no matter what the cost to the people of Taiwan.
Of course, these were exactly the gifts Hu was hoping to receive. No wonder Lien received such imperial reception. It was truly pathetic to see Lien attempt to sell out the people of Taiwan in this way. However, in a democracy, the people have the right to decide their own fate. The people should very clearly demonstrate to Lien just what they think of him. If he is allowed to get away with this, then this generation will be a laughingstock for the generations to come.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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