Who would have thought that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) -- two implacable political enemies who fought two presidential elections and who have not met in more than four years -- could speak to each other after all. It was only a brief telephone conversation they had last Monday, but it was said to be polite, and offered the possibility that the two men would speak again.
Before this, there had been internecine conflict over China policy, but now the government wants to use the visits of the opposition leaders to China to feel out Beijing's bottom line, to see what structure -- short of unification -- might be possible and to see what international space exists for the survival of the Republic of China.
As the saying goes, only the person who ties the bell around the tiger's neck can untie it, so it was only after Beijing issued an invitation to People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) that the role of the opposition as pathfinders for cross-strait relations was established. With Lien and Soong competing for Hu's favor, Chen had to return to the political high-ground of the Chen-Soong 10-point consensus in response, and then went one step further in the telephone conversation with Lien to balance their roles. Clearly the call was not without political significance.
The meeting between Hu and Lien is the first round in this game, and even though it has its historical significance, the fact that neither of his would-be successors -- Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平), -- have accompanied him means that the chances of there being much follow-up to the visit are not high. Wang says he did not think the timing was right, and Ma has been calling for Taiwan to be given more room to maneuver within the international community.
So, in what can be regarded as Lien's "graduation" trip, only Premier Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) has wished him "good health," while Lien's colleagues are busy erecting firewalls in case the trip damages their election hopes in 2008.
The 10-point consensus allows the Hu and Soong meeting to offer more opportunities. Since this meeting will follow on the heels of the Hu-Lien talks, it must be successful for Soong, because the PFP faces even greater pressures. Soong may have to follow Lien into retirement.
The PFP is presently getting a smaller share of the limelight, and Soong's visit is a major political gamble that he cannot afford to lose. This situation also explains his late-night work meetings aimed at understanding how cross-strait peace really can be achieved.
Beijing understands there is competition between Lien and Soong and knows what chips each man can bring to the table. It is this crucial moment -- which will decide their future political lives -- that gives Beijing the room it wants to stir up Taiwan's domestic politics. The problem is that the ball is now in Beijing's court. We don't know what their next move will be, but it will tell us whether Hu is able to step out of the shadow of former president Jiang Zemin (江澤民).
All of Taiwan, and even the world, is waiting to see what will happen next. It was massive public pressure that forced Lien to telephone Chen, so an attempt to sell out Taiwan while everyone is looking would be preposterous.
It is very possible that Lien's political scheming will attract public anger. The cross-strait impasse is providing politicians with a stage, and Chen, Lien and Soong must now consider the truth that the Taiwanese people's perception of events, and not Beijing's, is what really matters.
Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow at the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Ian Bartholomew and Perry Svensson
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