Having lived in Japan for some time, I feel that I understand how the Japanese government is less than perfect.
And after taking many history courses at my Japanese university, I have seen first hand how many Japanese feel about the textbook and other problems.
Which brings me to my point. After the anti-Japan demonstrations -- or riots -- began, I started to think about how many of the Chinese students I have met have very different memories to mine, and I began to wonder if the history taught in China, like that taught anywhere else, was less than complete in a few areas.
With the recent outbreaks in China against Japan, I started to wonder why the Chinese government and people have hard feelings toward Japan over disputed islands.
Is it not true that South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan also claim ownership of these islands?
And why has China not made any complaints until recent years? China, which preaches the status quo on the Taiwan issue, is doing anything but that and trying to drag Japan into a long legal battle over an issue that has been ignored for nearly 50 years.
I suspect that China's recent interest in the islands was sparked by the discovery of oil. I would like to know why China has not said anything to any other nations about these islands.
I would also like to say that I agree with Japan on protecting Japanese people and interests in China. It is clearly China's responsibility to defend the Japanese embassy in China, and it seems fairly obvious to me that China is doing nothing to protect it.
What would China say if Japanese civilians started to attack the Chinese embassy in Tokyo?
What would China say if Japanese citizens took to the streets in protest every time a Chinese person in Japan committed a crime?
I'm thinking of events that took place two years ago where two Chinese students studying in Japan murdered their teacher and their teacher's family in an attempt to gain bank-account information, and how not two weeks goes by without something on the news about a Chinese student committing a violent crime either against another student or a Japanese civilian.
I do, however, agree with Asian nations seeking compensation from the Japanese over the atrocities committed during World War II, and I feel that most Japanese citizens do too.
However, I disagree with the way China and other nations are going about this.
The ordinary Japanese public did not commit the crimes, and the Japanese government did not commit the crimes either. The Japanese Empire, no longer in existence, committed those crimes, and neither Japan nor its people should have to pay for them.
Instead, I feel that these attacks should be aimed at what remains of the empire -- the emperor.
If groups were to seek compensation from the emperor, I feel that they would receive more support from the world, and from Japanese people themselves.
Darin ten Bruggencate
Japan
China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) earlier this month said it is necessary for her to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and it would be a “huge boost” to the party’s local election results in November, but many KMT members have expressed different opinions, indicating a struggle between different groups in the party. Since Cheng was elected as party chairwoman in October last year, she has repeatedly expressed support for increased exchanges with China, saying that it would bring peace and prosperity to Taiwan, and that a meeting with Xi in Beijing takes priority over meeting
The political order of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) first took shape in 1988. Then-vice president Lee succeeded former president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) after he passed, and served out the remainder of his term in office. In 1990, Lee was elected president by the National Assembly, and in 1996, he won Taiwan’s first direct presidential election. Those two, six and four-year terms were an era-defining 12-year presidential tenure. Throughout those years, Lee served as helmsman for Taiwan’s transition from martial law and authoritarianism to democracy. This period came to be known as the “quiet revolution,” leaving a legacy containing light
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
RSS