The violent anti-Japanese protests we are seeing in China are the product of the Chinese government's deliberate manipulation and their policy of cultivating hate. Furthermore, the root of the problem is simply their increasingly fascist orientation.
These recent protests are the most serious since the revival of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations in 1972, and the hand of the Chinese government can be clearly seen behind them. Starting last summer, the government closed down a number of Web sites run by anti-Japanese groups in China and clamped down on anti-Japanese movements centered on young people.
Nevertheless, this time around, extreme right-wing groups such as the China Federation of Defending the Diaoyutai Islands were given a free hand to mobilize protesters on the Internet, and the street rallies have enjoyed tacit official approval.
In the background lies the anti-Japanese sentiment that pervades the younger generation, something that is to be blamed on more than a decade of an education of hate advocated by the leadership since former president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) came to power. The 20-somethings stirring up trouble in the streets of Beijing now are none other than the "new generation of Japan-haters" the authorities have been nurturing.
This is not only a turning point in Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, it also blows away the theory of peaceful trade. That theory that deeper economic ties between two countries will also bring the closer politically. But actually, in the past decade or so the continued expansion of trade between China and Japan has been accompanied by new heights in anti-Japanese sentiment and propaganda spread by Beijing. Nowadays, the Japanese have to concede that increased trade has gone hand-in-hand with a worsening of political relations.
The fundamental causes behind this worsening of relations are not rooted in history, they are contemporary. They derive from the very nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The name of the party would lead one to believe it to be left-wing, but it has become thoroughly fascist in orientation.
Fascism embraces expansionism and hate -- the worship of military power working towards imperialist aggression. Products of such a system hate freedom and democracy, hate foreign countries (such as Japan, the US and even Taiwan). They hate, in other words, anything which threatens the power of the dictatorship, or presents an obstacle to its ability to expand and the sense of values that bolster it.
The increasing fascist tendencies of the Chinese government can be seen in the way Chinese history is taught. Such hate-propagating education cannot produce free people, it can only create slaves and despots. As children are subject to such education, the next generation of Chinese will be morally confused and will precipitate calamity.
Similarly, a government that relies on oppression at home and hate directed beyond its borders is not likely to promote understanding of other countries. The marriage of expansionism and hate leads only to war, and China's particularly modern brand of fascism, which has ample helpings of both, seems to be increasingly attracted by the idea of war.
The evil now being propagated by the CCP concerns the party's ability to maintain its hold on power. Whether or not it does so, and whether or not other East Asian nations choose policies of appeasement or resistance, will be decisive for the future of East Asia.
Chang Hsi-mo is an assistant professor at the Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies at National Sun Yat-sen University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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