All eyes were on China's "anti-secession" legislation, but the articles were not revealed until last minute. Putting aside for the minute the actual details, the very nature and lack of transparency in the whole legislative process reveals the dearth of freedom and the sham of democracy in politics in China.
According to a report by the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Wang Zhaoguo (
First, it is apparent that the law is aimed at Taiwan and not, as some had believed, designed to encompass areas such as Xinjiang or Tibet. The law would better be called the "anti-Taiwan seceding from China law." But the law just doesn't concern Taiwan. It is a problem that the political parties in this country, and the international community, must address.
Second, the constitutional ruling that "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China," and the law's characterization of the Taiwan question as a problem "left over from China's civil war" essentially denies or belittles the sovereign status of Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC).
As far as the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is concerned, this is also seriously provocative, and represents an aboutface, not to mention a flagrant distortion of reality. Silence on the part of Taiwan and the international community regarding the wording of this law is tantamount to accepting the fact that the civil war was not finished. It also supports China in its efforts to solve its "internal affairs."
Wang's report labels democracy in Taiwan the result of the pro-independence movement, claiming that this threatens the peace and stability of the Strait and the Asia-Pacific region. This is not only deeply offensive to the development of democracy in Taiwan, it challenges the principle of democratic freedom everywhere. This blatant effort to restrict Taiwan's democracy is the main reason behind observers' concerns that the Anti-Secession Law is Taiwan's "Article 23 of the Basic Law" in Hong Kong.
Regardless of how the legislation seeks to dress up or package Beijing's pretenses at peace and goodwill, its basic aim is to justify China's use of "non-peaceful means" and give them a legal basis. Of some concern is the fact that, regardless of whether it provides the right to decide to use force, or the opportunity to instigate hostilities, the law basically gives the hardline faction in China a blank check.
Giving the State Council or the Central Military Commission the right to decide whether to use non-peaceful means raises concerns that they can attack without Beijing's approval. This moves beyond being just a license to go to war, it is an endorsement to do so.
The "three prerequisites" for using force against Taiwan -- Taiwan's secession from China, major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China or the exhaustion of the possibility of peaceful reunification, are basically the same whether Taiwan is "already independent," "is going to be independent," just "wants to be independent" or indeed doesn't want unification. They can all be used as an excuse to attack.
The appearance of the anti-secession legislation is a timetable for unification with China in all but name. Taiwan and the rest of the world do not have the luxury of remaining silent on this issue, as it not only fundamentally alters the status quo in the Strait, it also challenges freedom, democracy and human rights, and represents a serious threat to regional peace.
Lo Chih-cheng is an associate professor in the politics department of Soochow University and executive director of the Institute for National Policy Research.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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