Taiwan is not alone being worried about China's military buildup. Tokyo is also gravely concerned. So much so that it now regards China as a security threat on par with North Korea.
Japan, like Taiwan, will have even more cause for concern with another annual increase (of 12.6 percent) in China's defense spending now totaling 245 billion yuan (about US$30 billion). Which, of course, is a gross underestimation as a chunk of China's defense expenditure is disguised under other categories. Besides, because of China's low cost economy, it gets more for its buck.
According to press reports, China is putting together a large number of amphibious ships and submarines. There are no prizes for guessing that all this is meant to create an urgency of sorts about the Taiwan situation. Beijing is building hysteria nationally and internationally with Taiwan appearing to be the source of all the trouble and being fired up to declare independence.
Beijing, therefore, seeks to present itself as the wronged party taking pre-emptive measures to protect its territorial integrity. Its so-called "anti-secession" bill is part of the same process.
Such brazen audacity is breathtaking, but it is seemingly effective. It has caused nervousness and anxiety in Taiwan. There is also talk now of adopting a middle path, whatever that means. In a long feature story on Australian television, President Chen Shui-bian (
But China is unconvinced. Its position is that any forward movement in China-Taiwan relations must take place within the gambit of "one China," with Taiwan as its part. In other words, any talks between the two sides will revolve around the degree of Taiwan's relative autonomy, something like Hong Kong's status.
Ever since the normalization of its relations with the US in the 1970s, China has followed an inflexible policy towards Taiwan. First, it has sought to further isolate Taiwan internationally by invoking the "one China" mantra as its guiding policy. And it seems to have succeeded pretty well in this. Even when China has targeted missiles at Taiwan and is putting together amphibious ships accompanied by submarines, the world seems largely apathetic to the new danger except for the US and Japan. Indeed, the EU is even planning to lift its arms embargo on China.
The second aspect of China's Taiwan policy has been to pressure the US into ditching Taipei. But this hasn't worked. Indeed, during the early period of the Bush administration, Washington's commitment became even sharper with President George W. Bush pledging to do "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan. But with the US increasingly mired in Iraq, and engaged in a global war on terrorism, it has pressured Taipei into not provoking Beijing.
But China, it seems, is intent on exploiting the present international situation to its advantage by its anti-secession legislation. It is, in effect, telling the world that it will do whatever it takes to prevent Taiwan's "secession," even though Chen has said that it isn't in the offing. But they are worried that he might spring some surprise near or around the time of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. According to Wang Zhaoguo (王兆國), vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, "... we should be particularly watchful that the Taiwan authorities are trying to use so-called `constitutional' or `legal' means through `referendum' or `constitutional re-engineering' to back up their secessionist attempt with so-called `legality.'" In other words, as far as China is concerned, the people of Taiwan, all 23 million of them, have no say in the matter.
At another level Beijing has sought to divide Taiwan's body politic by playing one group against the other, and by nurturing the country's business community keen on trade and investment opportunities in China. The results are rather mixed. It is true that many Taiwanese are not keen on outright independence, particularly when China threatens to unleash war. But most wouldn't like the prospect of annexation by China. They would prefer the status quo with ambiguity about its future status.
Beijing, though, wants Taipei to accept the "one China" formula. If not, it would continue its policy of destabilizing Taiwan with a view to annex it at an opportune time.
The anti-secession law is only an extension of the old policy to give it a more serious and sinister turn. It is intended to create fear in Taiwan of Chinese reprisals against those with personal and business stakes in China.
But China seems to be over-playing its hand. For instance, it is the first time that Taiwan has become a common issue in the US-Japan security alliance. A meeting in Washington of their foreign and defense ministers on Feb. 19 identified security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective."
Indeed, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima told a press conference that the joint declaration on security will include, besides Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the northern Pacific Ocean.
In other words, Japan is becoming an active member of its security alliance with the US. They are no longer standing aside with the US taking all the heat. The US is obviously worried about China's rising military power. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the US "thinks about and is concerned about and is attentive to" China's military buildup.
In Japan, there is growing popular concern about the Chinese security threat. Urging the government to remonstrate strongly with the EU about their proposed lifting of arms embargo against China, Yoshio Okubo wrote in the Daily Yomiuri, "It would do no good and a lot of harm for Japan to be unduly conciliatory toward China, disregarding the reality of what is currently taking place. No time should be wasted addressing the growing threat of China's military buildup."
It is, therefore, not inconceivable that if China continues on its course, the US-Japan security alliance might be expanded at some point of time to formally include Taiwan as its member. Because Taiwan is not the only country feeling threatened.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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