Are Taiwan and China two different countries? The answer is yes and no. It is yes when China vows to reunite with Taiwan. It is no when China's parliament plans to enact an "anti-secession" law to prevent the "split" of Taiwan from China.
One cannot help but wonder what has gotten into the minds of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They are not only delusional, but also deranged. Or they are sales geniuses.
In the draft of the anti-secession law, it mandates an invasion of Taiwan if Taiwan achieves a complete "independent" status or if efforts toward peaceful unification are exhausted. The whole draft mentions only Taiwan; the Republic of China (ROC) has completely disappeared.
The pan-blue camp has generally played down the impact of the law or scoffed at pro-independence figures for inviting China's legal warfare. The pan-blues couldn't care less that its beloved ROC has completely disappeared from the mindset and language of China's National People's Congress delegates.
China's enactment of the law is a living testament that even the status quo -- an indefinite delay on unification -- could trigger an attack from China.
China is trying to play a semantic word game using words like "secession" and non-peaceful for its propaganda aims. And China's strategy -- to box in Taiwan under the ROC -- is very clear and clever.
China's marketing and packaging may become more sophisticated, but its sale to the Taiwanese remains a fat chance.
Yang Ji charng
Columbus, Ohio
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