While Taiwan's localization forces expressed discontent over the 10-point consensus reached by President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) last month, and have voiced an emphatic protest against Beijing's anti-secession law, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) set forth a four-point guideline for cross-strait relations on March 4.
While explaining the guideline, Hu for the first time directly responded to the 10-point consensus, and for the first time addressed Chen as the leader of the "Taiwan authorities." This was interpreted by the media as a thaw in cross-strait relations. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Vice Chairman Chiu Tai-san (邱太三) said it could almost be seen as "the first dialogue between Chen and Hu."
It is in the interest of Chinese leaders to respond to the Taiwanese government's movements toward unification and away from independence. But for real dialogue to take place, China should prove that it is reasonable by postponing or calling off the proposed "anti-secession" law, or watering it down to the point where it loses importance, thereby saving Chen from his recent distress. That, however, is very unlikely.
Hu's guidelines are evidence that China's leadership is still stuck in an authoritarian "carrot-and-stick" way of thinking. Why do they think they can set such a rigid conclusion, and then use a carrot-and-stick approach to demand that Taiwan accept it? Let us modify the four-point guideline to highlight its absurdity:
First, never stray from adhering to the "one China, one Taiwan" principle.
Second, never give up efforts to seek peaceful independence.
Third, never change the principle of placing hope in the Chinese people.
Fourth, never compromise in opposing the threat of military unification.
Does anything about this represent meaningful communication? Apart from China being stronger than Taiwan, the above reversal of roles does not make Taiwan's reasons seem any less reasonable. Unfortunately, the stance of Taiwan's leader has been weak and ambiguous, and even unreasonable and a source of trouble. This is also a part of the current Taiwan crisis.
I wonder why China does not tolerate a meaningful opposition party. Why not generate its lawmakers and national leader through competitive elections? In the 21st century, why does it continue to use despotic means to repress dissenters, including Falun Gong practitioners?
Taiwan is not unable to make concessions; rather, it is a question of why it should concede. Conceding to Soong without cause -- as with the 10-point consensus -- in fact amounted to concessions to Beijing. Small wonder Hu reacted positively. But didn't this concession call for further authoritarianism? If the existence of an independent Taiwan is important to China, it should call for freedom and democracy in China, not further authoritarianism.
Politically, economically, socially and culturally, Taiwan has been separated from China for over a half century. This historical separation cannot be resolved by an anti-secession law. Although cross-strait relations have become increasingly close as a result of intensifying economic and trade interactions over the past 10 years, deceit and coercion are still part of despotic rule. It is said that there used to be a thing called "the kingly way of government by justice," but it has not been heard of for a long time.
Chen I-shen is an associate researcher of the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica and deputy chairman of the Northern Taiwan Society.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti
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