Beijing's new grand strategy is "dominating East Asia without fighting." This strategy incorporates diplomatic, defense, cross-strait and domestic policies. As these policies become increasingly integrated, the total advantages are augmented by way of synergy (one plus one exceeds two). Although Beijing may never openly admit it, one of its ultimate goals is to gradually take over the US' domination of East Asia through economic and cultural means without war. Beijing is rapidly building up its already advanced military capabilities to strengthen the effects of its extra-military instruments, such as diplomacy, even though it prefers to keep its military force prepared but not used.
This new grand strategy comprises seven important elements:
1. Defusing China's domestic "time bombs" -- the most urgent task: Such as handling and containing the proliferation of protest movements.
2. Putting cooperation above contradictions with US policies: While being frank about differences, Beijing strives to expand bilateral communications.
3. Actively implementing the "policy on neighboring countries": To make them feel rich, secure and friendly toward Beijing, and to replace East Asia's "China fear" with "China fever."
4. Elevating relations with the EU as a potential counterweight against the US: EU trade with China has exceeded that with the US since 2003. Naturally, the EU wishes to lift its arms embargo against China.
5. Developing rapidly and quietly "acupuncture warfare" (點穴戰) capabilities (being able to strike decisively at other countries' strategic points) and acquiring a survivable nuclear deterrent: If one holds a big stick and speaks softly, who does not listen?
6. Preferring extra-military approaches on Taiwan and being prepared to wait: Five days after Chinese President Hu Jintao (
7. Entering Latin America to check US expansion and entering Africa to replace the US: Last year, about half of China's foreign investment -- much involved in oil diplomacy -- was in Latin America. Beijing has used oil diplomacy in Africa as well to fill a vacuum left by the US.
Only one link in the chain of this grand strategy focuses on Taiwan. Hu's tactics will be more creative and multifarious:
1. Being prepared to wait: Beijing now believes that "the US strategic expansion will slow down" in a decade, and haste over the cross-strait solution is unnecessary. This is the greatest distinction between Hu's approaches and those of Jiang Zemin (
2. Emphasizing extra-military means: Apart from launching psychological warfare, legal warfare and media warfare on Taiwan, Hu may contain Taiwan on diplomatic, economic, cultural and even religious fronts.
3. Be harder on the Taipei government and softer on the Taiwanese people: Beijing denies the Taipei government opportunities to gain credit for alleviating cross-strait tension, as the current administration unambiguously rejects Beijing's "one China principle." Beijing seeks to exert pressure on Taipei indirectly through other means, especially Washington, to prevent Taipei from declaring de jure independence. Beijing, however, will be agile and pro-active in efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people.
Beijing's most favored option is to annex Taiwan without war. If a response to Taipei's move toward independence is required, Beijing's next option is "coercion on the brink" (
After Hu's supporters in the Communist Youth League and among Qinghua University alumni take up senior appointments in the Taiwan Affairs Office, a flexible approach in dealing with the Taiwan issue may emerge. An increasing number of semi-governmental academics have been studying the case of "one nation, three seats" held in the UN by the former Soviet Republic, Belarus and the Ukraine, the concept of "overlapping sovereignty," and the notion of a "United States of Chinese Republics."
US President George W. Bush has won a second presidential term with a shining victory. While subjectively his agenda is ambitious, objectively the surrounding conditions are no longer as favorable as four years ago. China's economy has grown dramatically, which has set in motion the ascendancy of China's cultural power. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasingly unbalanced. Furthermore, Beijing has never renounced its use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to suffocate Taiwan internationally, to degrade Taiwan's political status and to divide Taiwan's society. While wrestling with a giant, Taiwan must attain victory with wisdom.
Taiwan faces serious challenges today: Its economy may weaken, its diplomatic standing may slip, its social division may deteriorate, and its government may be further paralyzed. We must reduce internal attrition, and resort to our wisdom. Putting our house in order render us undefeatable. This is what we must do:
1. Prioritize our competing national goals: Political dignity, economic development and military security are what we all want, but in what order should they come?
2. Strengthen lateral communication within the ruling party and the government respectively: Only with improved internal coordination can we maximize our strength.
3. Promote harmony and consensus in society: Democracy is not simply "majority rule," "minority right" is equally important. In the legislature, the pan-blue camp should respect the pan-green camp. Among the general population, the pan-green supporters should respect the pan-blue supporters.
4. Stabilize Taiwan-US relations: Prior consultations are not self-demeaning and are standard behavior between friends in the international community. In consultation, one is entitled to expressing reservations and disagreements. It is much easier to advise the other party beforehand on unpleasant events than to explain difficulties afterwards.
5. Acquire asymmetrical warfare capabilities: Defense reform should emphasize elevating military scholarship, improving the understanding of our enemy, pluralizing promotion channels and internationalizing the outlook of our soldiers.
6. Implement a China policy of allying with the majority to check the minority: To win over 95.3 percent of the Chinese population (the people and the local elite) and to deal with the remaining 4.7 percent (the Communist Party and the central government). We should not, in a sweeping manner, treat everyone in China as an enemy.
Lin Chong-Pin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, and the author of a recently published book Win With Wisdom: When Wrestling With A Giant.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI
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