World failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons appears to be a sobering reflection of how threats, cajoling and promises of rewards will not stop a country seeking such arms from acquiring them.
At a quick glance, Pyongyang's example seems applicable to Tehran -- and perhaps other countries waiting in the wings with clandestine nuclear activities yet to be revealed.
Like Iran, North Korea exploited fears of its nuclear ambitions to wrest international concessions. Like the Islamic Republic, it then held the world in the thrall of on-off negotiations before the final steps that many fear Iran will also take -- breaking with the rest of the world to make the bomb.
In apparent confirmation of world fears, North Korea boasted publicly for the first time last Thursday that it has nuclear weapons.
US President George W. Bush has named both North Korea and Iran as part of an "axis of evil," along with prewar Iraq.
But a closer look offers some hope that Iran and other countries that may have the capacity to go nuclear will not automatically follow Pyongyang.
The threat level is one key consideration. For years the Northern regime appeared convinced it was about to become the target of a full US invasion -- or nuclear attack. The country's isolation fed such concerns to the point that Pyongyang tried to justify its move last Thursday by asserting it was only responding to American threats "with a nuclear stick."
A senior official with the International Atomic Energy Agency -- the UN nuclear watchdog kicked out of North Korea two years ago -- said the North's response was typical of a country that "feels it has no choice but to acquire nukes."
"It will only get to that point if it feels totally insecure and without other options," said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Iran is not at that point -- yet.
A regional power of nearly 70 million people, it has no enemy at its doorstep, unlike North Korea, whose army faces hundreds of thousands of South Korean and US troops. Neighboring Iraq, Iran's wartime foe under Saddam Hussein, remains in post-Saddam turmoil.
The threat of attack exists -- both Israel and the US have refused to rule out pre-emptive strikes over fears Iran is trying to develop the bomb.
But that threat would only increase if Iran suddenly broke off negotiations with European powers or contacts with the IAEA and went underground -- as did North Korea. Both the US and Israel would see such a move as further proof that Iran was working on nuclear arms.
Iran insists it does not want the bomb -- and if that's true then it has much to gain by not turning into a hermit country. The talks with Britain, France and Germany could give it things it wants, such as technical help, economic concessions and a greater voice in the world.
But even if Washington is right in accusing Tehran of lying, it appears in Tehran's interest to keep talking. By doing so, it can keep suspicions at bay and the world guessing about its true intentions.
Gary Saymore, director at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, is among those who believe Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons. Still, he says it's worthwhile to keep Tehran talking, to win time if for no other reason.
"The Iranians have shown a reluctance to risk confrontation," he said. "They are afraid the big powers will act against them, and ... they are very nervous about possible US attack.
Saymore, who followed Iran in the US State Department and the White House in the 1990s, thinks interaction with the rest of the world -- and the resulting pressure of world opinion -- has kept Tehran from developing nuclear weapons up to now.
"In the case of North Korea, it's too late," he said. "In the case of Iran, there may still be some combination of threat and inducement to persuade them to delay."
George Jahn has covered International Atomic Energy Agency and nuclear issues since 2000.
In late January, Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine, the Hai Kun (海鯤, or Narwhal), completed its first submerged dive, reaching a depth of roughly 50m during trials in the waters off Kaohsiung. By March, it had managed a fifth dive, still well short of the deep-water and endurance tests required before the navy could accept the vessel. The original delivery deadline of November last year passed months ago. CSBC Corp, Taiwan, the lead contractor, now targets June and the Ministry of National Defense is levying daily penalties for every day the submarine remains unfinished. The Hai Kun was supposed to be
Reports about Elon Musk planning his own semiconductor fab have sparked anxiety, with some warning that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) could lose key customers to vertical integration. A closer reading suggests a more measured conclusion: Musk is advancing a strategic vision of in-house chip manufacturing, but remains far from replacing the existing foundry ecosystem. For TSMC, the short-term impact is limited; the medium-term challenge lies in supply diversification and pricing pressure, only in the long term could it evolve into a structural threat. The clearest signal is Musk’s announcement that Tesla and SpaceX plan to develop a fab project dubbed “Terafab”
Most schoolchildren learn that the circumference of the Earth is about 40,000km. They do not learn that the global economy depends on just 160 of those kilometers. Blocking two narrow waterways — the Strait of Hormuz and the Taiwan Strait — could send the economy back in time, if not to the Stone Age that US President Donald Trump has been threatening to bomb Iran back to, then at least to the mid-20th century, before the Rolling Stones first hit the airwaves. Over the past month and a half, Iran has turned the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 39km wide at
The ongoing Middle East crisis has reinforced an uncomfortable truth for Taiwan: In an increasingly interconnected and volatile world, distant wars rarely remain distant. What began as a regional confrontation between the US, Israel and Iran has evolved into a strategic shock wave reverberating far beyond the Persian Gulf. For Taiwan, the consequences are immediate, material and deeply unsettling. From Taipei’s perspective, the conflict has exposed two vulnerabilities — Taiwan’s dependence on imported energy and the risks created when Washington’s military attention is diverted. Together, they offer a preview of the pressures Taiwan might increasingly face in an era of overlapping geopolitical