Recent controversies over Premier Yu Shyi-kun's use of the phrase "balance of terror" to counter China's military threats and the Hoklo language used by Minister of Foreign Affairs Mark Chen (陳唐山) to express his dissatisfaction with Singapore have stirred much criticism and prompted a war of words examining these officials' use of inappropriate language in public. The more rudimentary cause of their emotional reactions, however, is Taiwan's inability to change the status quo under China's long-term suppression.
Strictly speaking, the government has exerted its utmost effort in grappling with foreign relations, and its main purpose is to ensure Taiwan's self-awareness in the hope that China and the international community will eventually recognize Taiwan's existence.
The greatest risk in this strategy is that, given the difficulties in making Taiwan's voice heard in China and the international society, Taiwan itself is held responsible for the consequences of provoking cross-strait tension. Military and diplomatic hardship is inevitable when a small nation like Taiwan faces the reality of international politics.
From a military point of view, cross-strait relations currently are obviously tenser than four years ago when President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was first elected as a president. Struggling for survival under the shadow of China is Taiwan's fate. Expanding cross-strait economic relations in recent years has not alleviated cross-strait hostility. On the contrary it has made them worse.
Without basic mutual trust between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, many cross-strait policy makers' predict that a cross-strait war will eventually take place. Along with increased military deployments -- both qualitatively and quantitatively -- and rising Chinese nationalism, a cross-strait war becomes increasingly likely.
Looking from the political side, Taiwan's "populist diplomacy" has become the norm, as a result of China's long-term diplomatic suppression and the progress of Tai-wan's democracy. To prove we are able to combat China's incessant diplomatic impediments, Taiwan's government officials have put all of their hopes in diplomatic trips.
If they make a breakthrough in forming friendships with a country that does not have diplomatic relations with us, this is regarded as a major success. Activities that can help increase Taiwan's exposure in international society, such as the Olympic Games and international beauty contests, also become our diplomatic arenas.
Our efforts have not gained much recognition in the international community. The response to the government's decision to hold a national referendum at the same time as the presidential election this year, and the fact that no country other than our diplomatic allies spoke in favor of Taiwan's participation in the UN during the recent session of the UN General Assembly both seem to indicate that the possibility of changing Taiwan's diplomatic status within a short period of time is minimal.
The collision between Taiwan's insistence on maintaining its self-awareness and the international reality has resulted in the gradual depletion of political and economic resources, which has led to Taiwan mistakenly putting its faith in Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤).
Viewed from Taiwan's perspective, there are three possible directions in which cross-strait relations can develop.
First, Chinese leaders may gradually begin to feel that long-term suppression can't solve cross-strait tension; therefore, more practical strategies, including recognizing Taiwan's political entity, and conditionally facilitating Taiwan's return to international society could be implemented.
In fact, Taiwan has made several attempts to restart cross-strait talks, and research units in China have put forward different options, but "one China" is the key to determining whether the cross-strait issue can be resolved.
Since Taiwan is reluctant to make any concession on the "one China" principle, China can't sense any goodwill from Taiwan. Due to the lack of mutual trust, it seems unrealistic to expect China to make any large-scale adjustments on the Taiwan issue.
Second, the cross-strait enmity is becoming more intense as the arms race escalates. Chinese leaders, under great internal pressure, could decide to use military power to solve the Taiwan issue. If China eventually uses military means to destroy Taiwan, it will need to meticulously evaluate issues, such as international pressure, the risk of US intervention, post-war political and economic impacts, and even how to effectively rule Taiwan.
The third and most likely scenario is that China continues to suppress Taiwan, escalating Tai-wan's internal contradictions; as a result, Taiwan's society will deteriorate into long-term disorder, finally undermining the democratic foundation that maintains Taiwan's stability.
It is a pity that, when considering future cross-strait relations, Taiwan's government officials seem to slip into dichotomized thinking, overemphasizing what is good or bad, rather than coming up with more practical solutions on "China's continuous suppression of Taiwan" and "Taiwan's adverse international situation."
It is not an easy task to maintain an equilibrium between retaining our self-awareness and the confrontation with a powerful nation. But Taiwan is not the only nation to have encountered such hardship.
During the Cold War, Finland, under the diplomatic and military pressure from the Soviet Union, couldn't help but detach itself from NATO. Although Finland was cautious in dealing with diplomatic issues, lest it provoke unnecessary conflicts with the Soviet Union, it still preserved its democratic tradition, and concentrated on economic development. It then became a wealthy country. The Finnish experience has taught us how a small country can peacefully coexist with a more powerful one.
The biggest challenge to the current leaders in Taiwan is how to construct a new strategic plan to peacefully coexist with China without giving up Taiwan's self-awareness.
Since Taiwan does not have enough strength to fight China, stubbornly advocating policies to counterattack China not only fails to win international support, but also runs counter to the mainstream international idea of engaging with China in order to change its regime fundamentally.
Taking care of Taiwan's self awareness while coexisting with China is the only way to resolve Taiwan's diplomatic and military dilemma.
Chen Mu-min is an assistant professor in the Graduate Institute of Political Science at National Changhua University of Education.
TRANSLATED BY LIN YA-TI
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