On Sept. 19, Jiang Zemin (
When Jiang received the then president of National Tsing Hua University Shen Chun-shan (
After taking leadership of the CCP in June 1989 and becoming chairman of the military commission in November of that year, he remained in a precarious position for at least five or six years, as former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) was governing China behind his back. He was also restrained by party heavyweights, and the views of hawkish military leaders.
Surprisingly, he prevailed under the bizarre circumstances following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. As other aged comrades gradually died away, his position solidified.
Of course, in terms of Jiang's survival during the extremely complex political and social situation between 1989 and 1996, his weight problem was just a joke. As the old saying goes, "the times produce their heroes." The key to his success lay mostly in the equality among all forces in Zhongnanhai. He distinguished himself from others because none of those forces was able to completely dominate the situation.
More surprisingly, after the low-key Jiang successfully rid himself of all his aged competitors in 1996, he began to display a strong will to lead. First, in 1997, he forced his strongest rival, Qiao Shi (
Was Jiang's success just a result of his political tactics? The answer is an unqualified "no." I once had a chance in 1993 to see him in person, as he was lec-tured subordinates for over half an hour. Honestly, he does not have the tricky, deep, sophisticated personality of his predecessors; he is also more boastful.
This characteristic is a minus in the battlefield of power. But Jiang's leadership style was quite appropriate in the 1990s, because the CCP was eager to boost its domestic economy, break through international blockades and resolve political disputes. The formation of Jiang's era -- especially China's unstoppable "peaceful rising" within 10 years of the Tiananmen Incident -- was actually 90 percent attributable to the overall situation and 10 percent due to luck.
Has the curtain dropped on Jiang's era? It is still too early to say. Although Hu is now serving as president, CCP general secretary and chairman of the military commission, he is not necessarily able to exercise his power yet. If Jiang's physical condition is still good, members of the "Shanghai clique" at the CCP's Political Bureau will be able to go visit him from time to time. Thus, the time for "what Hu says goes" has not arrived.
Whether Vice President Zeng Qinghong (
The Jiang faction inside the commission is perhaps rooted even deeper than that of the CCP's politburo.
Lee Fu-chung is an assistant professor at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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