On Sept. 12, Hong Kong will hold legislative elections for the second time since the 1997 handover. Voters will express their attitudes toward China's open and unscrupulous interference in the territory's local affairs.
Taiwan will also hold legislative elections at the end of this year. If the green camp can win a majority in the Legislative Yuan, it will be able to resolve the legislative chaos created by pro-China politicians and implement policies and reforms smoothly. Hence, the democratic movements in both Taiwan and Hong Kong are at a crucial juncture.
Under such circumstances, democratic forces in Taiwan and Hong Kong must unite to preserve democracy. This will not only further the welfare of their people, but will also aid China's democratic development, since the political progress of Taiwan and Hong Kong is a positive influence. Unfortunately, cooperation between them remains insufficient due to psychological obstacles.
As Taiwan's democratization and localization are proceeding simultaneously, with excessive attention paid to the latter, the country often ignores globalization, and the development of China and Hong Kong. This is seen in the quantity of local media reports which ignore the special relations between Taiwan and China, which also includes Hong Kong.
Hong Kong must eliminate its bias against Taiwan. A true democrat must respect the Taiwanese people's choice for their future -- unification or independence. The people of Hong Kong do not want to be manipulated by an authoritarian regime either. Canada's province of Quebec was able to hold a referendum on independence, Czechoslovakia was able to split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 after the communist forces collapsed, and even East Timor was able to vote for independence from Indonesia. Why can't Taiwan, which has not been occupied by China, remain independent?
Today, Hong Kong's understanding of Taiwan remains unchanged, with media reports about the island being mostly negative. Hong Kong does not understand that even if the development of Taiwan's democratic movement is seriously flawed, it's better than that of Hong Kong, where the people do not have a direct election for the chief executive.
While Beijing often smears the territory's democratic movement as "populism," some Hong Kong democrats echo Taiwan's pro-China figures and do exactly the same to Taiwan. This is sad. Perhaps it is a result of the long-term influence of Taiwan's pro-China media on their Hong Kong counterparts, which have ignored the Taiwanese people's voice.
If the people of Hong Kong can view the situation from the perspective of the changes in the territory's media, in which pro-democratic media have been blocked, they should be able to understand Taiwan's present predicament, especially the media's influence on public opinion.
Freedom of speech in Hong Kong has been limited since the territory's return to China. Particularly, political accusations of treason and spying can be heard almost everywhere, while fake Chinese nationalism grows. Therefore, Taiwan should try to understand the difficult situation faced by Hong Kong's democrats.
On the other hand, while Hong Kong's democrats do not necessarily have to show their support for Taiwanese democracy, it's not necessary for them to attack Taiwan, or make reckless anti-independence and pro-unification remarks. After all, as long as Taiwan is not annexed by China, Beijing will maintain its policy of "one country, two systems," and let Hong Kong continue to serve as an example for Taiwan. This helps the territory avoid rapid sinification.
Paul Lin is a political commentator based in New York.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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