A couple hundred years ago China thought it was at the center of a world divided into two parts: one which accepted Chinese superiority and received the benefits of Confucian culture and another which ought to have. The idea that China can legislate for the world seems to have held fast. Last week we learned that a law mandating Taiwan's unification has been drafted in Beijing. We wondered what other country might pass laws about places and polities over which it had no control. Imagine the environmentally conscious Swedes passing a law forbidding gas-guzzling Americans from driving SUVs. Or the workaholic Germans passing a law restricting Spanish lunch breaks to a swift 30 minutes.
Chen Shui-bian (
Taiwan has to see passage of this "law" as a threat. But the cloud may have a silver lining. To say that China needs to come up with new thinking about Taiwan is a familiar refrain for this newspaper. Officially China has staked everything on "one country, two systems." And when that formula might yet have worked, there was little reason to give thought to any other way of bringing Taiwan back into the Chinese fold.
By any standards, however, "one country, two systems" has clearly failed. Far from Hong Kong basking in enviable prosperity created by its capitalist system, enviable freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law, and enviable security as a part of the "upcoming superpower," it now has none of those things. The only people there who appear content are the clique of businessmen China has appointed to run the place. It is quite obvious that Hong Kong's fate now provides the strongest disincentive for Taiwan to consider a unification deal.
The only solution Beijing will consider to its "Taiwan problem" is therefore vacuous. Beyond that there are also a host of limitations on the way the Taiwan issue can be discussed in China. Taiwan independence, which in de facto or de jure forms is what the majority of Taiwanese want, can only be regarded as the wish of a small minority of deluded "compatriots," most of whom are dupes a "foreign power." However unrealistic this is -- and the delusion is perfectly obvious to any Chinese scholar with Internet access -- it is a thought crime in China to discuss Taiwan in any other way.
That doesn't mean people haven't been doing so. The very prominence given to rent-a-quote "academics" toeing the official line by Xinhua and other state-owned media, along with anecdotal evidence from personal contacts, suggests to China-watchers both new thinking and an attempt to suppress it. The draft law is a tool in that suppression. It is there to, in effect, criminalize any proposal concerning resolution of the Taiwan issue except that mandated by the government. Ironically, Beijing needs this not because of Taiwan itself -- over which it has no control -- but because new thinking on Taiwan calls attention to the failure of Hong Kong. And that is something that simply cannot be admitted.
Taiwan aims to elevate its strategic position in supply chains by becoming an artificial intelligence (AI) hub for Nvidia Corp, providing everything from advanced chips and components to servers, in an attempt to edge out its closest rival in the region, South Korea. Taiwan’s importance in the AI ecosystem was clearly reflected in three major announcements Nvidia made during this year’s Computex trade show in Taipei. First, the US company’s number of partners in Taiwan would surge to 122 this year, from 34 last year, according to a slide shown during CEO Jensen Huang’s (黃仁勳) keynote speech on Monday last week.
On May 7, 1971, Henry Kissinger planned his first, ultra-secret mission to China and pondered whether it would be better to meet his Chinese interlocutors “in Pakistan where the Pakistanis would tape the meeting — or in China where the Chinese would do the taping.” After a flicker of thought, he decided to have the Chinese do all the tape recording, translating and transcribing. Fortuitously, historians have several thousand pages of verbatim texts of Dr. Kissinger’s negotiations with his Chinese counterparts. Paradoxically, behind the scenes, Chinese stenographers prepared verbatim English language typescripts faster than they could translate and type them
More than 30 years ago when I immigrated to the US, applied for citizenship and took the 100-question civics test, the one part of the naturalization process that left the deepest impression on me was one question on the N-400 form, which asked: “Have you ever been a member of, involved in or in any way associated with any communist or totalitarian party anywhere in the world?” Answering “yes” could lead to the rejection of your application. Some people might try their luck and lie, but if exposed, the consequences could be much worse — a person could be fined,
When China passed its “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005, much of the democratic world saw it as yet another sign of Beijing’s authoritarianism, its contempt for international law and its aggressive posture toward Taiwan. Rightly so — on the surface. However, this move, often dismissed as a uniquely Chinese form of legal intimidation, echoes a legal and historical precedent rooted not in authoritarian tradition, but in US constitutional history. The Chinese “Anti-Secession” Law, a domestic statute threatening the use of force should Taiwan formally declare independence, is widely interpreted as an emblem of the Chinese Communist Party’s disregard for international norms. Critics