A couple hundred years ago China thought it was at the center of a world divided into two parts: one which accepted Chinese superiority and received the benefits of Confucian culture and another which ought to have. The idea that China can legislate for the world seems to have held fast. Last week we learned that a law mandating Taiwan's unification has been drafted in Beijing. We wondered what other country might pass laws about places and polities over which it had no control. Imagine the environmentally conscious Swedes passing a law forbidding gas-guzzling Americans from driving SUVs. Or the workaholic Germans passing a law restricting Spanish lunch breaks to a swift 30 minutes.
Chen Shui-bian (
Taiwan has to see passage of this "law" as a threat. But the cloud may have a silver lining. To say that China needs to come up with new thinking about Taiwan is a familiar refrain for this newspaper. Officially China has staked everything on "one country, two systems." And when that formula might yet have worked, there was little reason to give thought to any other way of bringing Taiwan back into the Chinese fold.
By any standards, however, "one country, two systems" has clearly failed. Far from Hong Kong basking in enviable prosperity created by its capitalist system, enviable freedoms guaranteed by the Basic Law, and enviable security as a part of the "upcoming superpower," it now has none of those things. The only people there who appear content are the clique of businessmen China has appointed to run the place. It is quite obvious that Hong Kong's fate now provides the strongest disincentive for Taiwan to consider a unification deal.
The only solution Beijing will consider to its "Taiwan problem" is therefore vacuous. Beyond that there are also a host of limitations on the way the Taiwan issue can be discussed in China. Taiwan independence, which in de facto or de jure forms is what the majority of Taiwanese want, can only be regarded as the wish of a small minority of deluded "compatriots," most of whom are dupes a "foreign power." However unrealistic this is -- and the delusion is perfectly obvious to any Chinese scholar with Internet access -- it is a thought crime in China to discuss Taiwan in any other way.
That doesn't mean people haven't been doing so. The very prominence given to rent-a-quote "academics" toeing the official line by Xinhua and other state-owned media, along with anecdotal evidence from personal contacts, suggests to China-watchers both new thinking and an attempt to suppress it. The draft law is a tool in that suppression. It is there to, in effect, criminalize any proposal concerning resolution of the Taiwan issue except that mandated by the government. Ironically, Beijing needs this not because of Taiwan itself -- over which it has no control -- but because new thinking on Taiwan calls attention to the failure of Hong Kong. And that is something that simply cannot be admitted.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval