Beijing has declared the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo to be a Chinese province in its day. Koguryo was without doubt part of Chinese civilization. South Koreans, though, regard it as their founding civilization. They are, therefore, furious at China's new claim. The region in question included much of what is today called North Korea.
What this means is that Koreans -- whether they like it or not -- have been appropriated by China as part of their domain. This is part of Beijing's grand plan to reclaim all people and territories regarded as historically theirs. Take, for instance, the case of the islands in the South China Sea. China has already claimed the Spratly and Paracel groups of islands. As a result,
sea lanes in the South China Sea
have become national waterways under Chinese law, and therefore places where China can enforce its authority when it is powerful enough to do so. Other islands and territories are also claimed by China, giving Beijing the pretext at any opportune time to annex them.
No wonder South Korea is worried. As Kim Woo-jun of the Korean Institute of East-West Affairs has said, "This is not a purely historical issue. If Koguryo is incorrectly interpreted by China as China's old kingdom, the North Korean region becomes China's historical territory. And this can serve as a justification for future Chinese intervention."
Taiwan, of course, is regarded as a "renegade province," waiting to be annexed. There is now even speculation on how long Taiwan can last on its own if attacked by China.
According to one source in Taipei, "in the event of a `first strike,' the air force and the navy can preserve three quarters of their fighting capabilities while the army can maintain 80 percent of its fighting capabilities."
It added, "Under these circumstances, Taiwan can hold on for two weeks in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait."
In the midst of China's military threat to Taiwan and its high-profile regional ambitions, it is hard to understand why the US has come out at this time with plans for redeployment of ground forces.
The plan involves thinning forces in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, where South Korea will lose about one-third of the 37,000 US troops stationed there. Japan will be similarly affected, with precise numbers unknown at this time.
The rationale is that the world has changed since the end of
the Cold War in the 1990s, and
that new threats require new responses and strategies. As US President George W. Bush has put it, "For decades, America's armed forces abroad have essentially remained where the wars of the last century ended, in Europe and Asia."
In future, the US would rely more heavily on special forces and small contingents of "forward forces" to provide a rapid response capability, while its roving naval deployment and high-tech capability will ensure global supremacy.
But the redeployment, by focusing on rapid reaction and high-tech resources, seems to overlook the possibility that future military threats are not likely to fit the American prescription. Take Iraq, for instance. It is true that the US military rapidly defeated the enemy. But the subsequent quagmire requires the commitment of increasing numbers of ground troops to create some sort of order.
Similarly, in Iran, where the regime is daring the US to take it on, the easiest part would be to rain destruction. But the subsequent task of putting together
an acceptable alternative to the present regime will require a recurring commitment of troops to crush the inevitable insurgency.
In the Asia-Pacific, for instance, reducing US forces does not send the right message to China and North Korea. China threatens Taiwan almost daily, while North Korea is thumbing its nose at everyone by holding on to its nuclear capabilities.
As the New York Times has rightly pointed out, "The plan makes little long-term strategic sense. It is certain to strain crucial alliances, increase overall costs and dangerously weaken deterrence on the Korean peninsula at the worst possible moment."
And the Christian Science Monitor worryingly asks: "Will the reported drawdown of 20,000 troops from East Asia make America look weak in this region, or give the appearance that Washington is abandoning its friends in Seoul or Taipei?"
The Washington Post gives it a broader perspective: "North Korea has pressed for US troop withdrawals for years; now that
it is misbehaving in the nuclear field, it receives a reward, and for no concessions. China is increasingly throwing its weight around Southeast Asia; countries there that want a US counterbalance, even if they do not always dare say so, will become less confident."
The point is that any drawdown of US forces will be perceived as lack of resolve and commitment to regional security. With China extending its reach and influence and flexing its muscle, more countries in the Asia-Pacific will willingly or otherwise accommodate themselves to this new reality. In other words, China doesn't have to match US power to become a serious contender. The US is doing it all by itself by appearing less resolute.
And where does Japan fit into this picture?
It has three options. First,
it might continue as a junior
partner within the US security umbrella.
But it will increasingly need to make greater military and financial contributions to the alliance. That will require amendments to its Constitution.
Second, it might become part of a Beijing-sponsored "East Asia pact," a "strategic partnership" of regional countries under Chinese leadership.
Or third, it might remilitarize to become a competing power.
In other words, the planned US redeployment in Asia is quite unsettling.
It is creating uncertainty at a time when China and North Korea are indulging in dangerous brinksmanship.
Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
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