Since President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) re-election in March, the escalation of Beijing's rhetoric has reached worrying proportions. Its perilous assessment of the "Taiwan problem" is unlikely to change in the coming months: US-Taiwan relations continue to recover, and a pro-independence majority in the Taiwan legislature in December appears likely given a struggling opposition.
Nonetheless, as Beijing's leaders mull over their Taiwan policy, it needs to be kept in mind that there are powerful factors which are fundamentally opposed to Taiwan's independence. China's confidence in the US and the pan-blue camp to act as checks on Taiwan's independence movement has clearly waned. US support for Taiwan's defenses and its WHO drive has seriously shaken Beijing's trust in the US' sincerity in restraining independence forces. But graver still is the pan-blue camp's disarray. Its intense internal divisions, shaky leadership and inability to coordinate electoral strategies makes a pan-green majority in the Dec. 11 legislative election increasingly likely.
Even with pan-green legislature, three powerful obstacles still stand in the way of Taiwan's independence. First, the US has made clear its limited support for Taiwan's constitutional reform drive. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly was quoted as saying, should Taiwan's democratization efforts harm US and Taiwan's security interests, "we will say so clearly and bluntly." Washington has chosen a more direct approach with regard to its foreign policy but has been much more cautious with the signals it sends to Taipei. No matter how many weapons the US sells to Taiwan, it will not sacrifice peace and stability for the nation's democratic yearnings for independence.
The second factor is that constitutional reform is likely to be heavily contested. Chen's top aides have reiterated his vow to follow existing procedures which require amendments to receive three-quarters of the vote in both the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Such a lop-sided majority for the pan-green camp is virtually impossible. The blue camp is divided, not broken, and will remain a major player in constitutional revisions even without control of the legislature.
The third factor involves the absence of a consensus in Taiwan in terms of sovereignty. Only a small minority of the population is passionate about independence. By Chen's own admission, there is no consensus on Taiwan's official status as the country remains deeply divided after the March election. A recent poll by Taiwan Business Weekly indicated that the Taiwan's people understand the risks of independence and the drafting of a new constitution, as well as the very real prospect of a cross-strait war. They are also not especially interested in martyrdom. With at best divided support for independence at home, any sovereignty related reforms are unlikely to pass.
Fortunately, the Chen administration appears to understand these impediments and has shown no sign of sidestepping them. Chen's pro-independence Cabinet has toed the moderate line he set down in his inaugural speech, and the nation's stability has become a central component of public policy. Dismissive claims that China is a mere "paper tiger" originate from the "deep-greens" such as former President Lee Tung-hui (
Whether cross-strait relations devolve into a confrontational spiral will depend on cooler strategic heads in Beijing.
Andrew Wei-chih Yang is a research assistant at the China Studies department of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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