The Office of Taiwan Affairs under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement early yesterday morning, rushing to set the tone before President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) inauguration speech on May 20. The statement raises the bar a lot higher in terms of talking peace. Chen's speech, therefore, can only aim to maintain stability by defending the status quo.
Its content is numbingly familiar. It slams Chen's "five noes" and trumpets its "seven lines," leaving itself pinned to a "one China" framework. China's resolve to "never sit idly by" at the prospect of Taiwanese independence and its military chest-beating will appeal neither to the Taiwanese nor the international ear.
The statement does, however, bring Chinese intentions into sharper relief. Its release on the eve of the World Health Assembly's Geneva meeting, where Taiwan's push for observer status is again a cause for embarrassment, is meant to head off anger after the likely veto of the bid. Repeating its warning that only by accepting the "one China" principle will negotiations commence on "the issue of international living space of the Taiwan region," the Chinese added it would do its utmost to block any diplomatic step forward Taiwan takes.
The timing also reveals a degree of haste by addressing cross-strait relations in advance of Chen's speech. China now seems to have no faith in Chen's "five noes," if it ever did. On the other hand, China equates the plan to write a new constitution by 2006 with the push for Taiwanese independence as a whole. This warning is simply a clumsy attempt to influence the drafting of the speech.
There was a token mention of Chen's proposals, such as establishing a mechanism for mutual trust
in military affairs and constructing a framework for peace and stability, but the statement cannot redeem the browbeating line that as long as China unifies with or annexes Taiwan, everything will be just fine. Beijing still expects this country to renounce every right that it is entitled to as a state in exchange for a promise that the People's Liberation Army will keep its distance and that some participation in the international community will be tolerated.
As Hong Kong has shown us, reunification with China amounts to the implementation of "one China" policies and the bankruptcy of the "two systems" promise, sweetened by the retention of a limited democracy. The Hong Kong model does not appeal to Taiwanese people.
China's statement is a predictable but insubstantial warning to the Taiwanese people and the Chen administration. It offers no solutions for the cross-strait impasse. Taiwan, therefore, need not be overly concerned about the statement's repetitions and unfriendliness.
China's economy is a much more pressing crisis. Cross-strait tension, in comparison, is a longstanding issue that requires some attention but which will not be resolved overnight.
China has showed its cards -- prematurely. There is no need for Chen to respond to the statement. If he does, it would seem Pavlovian rather than strategically sound. Chen should instead outline a framework under which cross-strait peace could be achieved. This is the real challenge for his next term.
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