Last year, China pressured the WTO secretariat to change Taiwan's title used in the directory from a "permanent mission" to an "office of permanent representative" so the title does not imply sovereignty.
This year, after China started a number of bilateral consultations with the US on the application of value-added tax on imported semiconductors, Beijing again notified other related member states that due to its problem with the title, China refused to have Taiwan participate as a third country. This once again politicized economic issues and made the WTO another battlefield in the cross-strait controversy.
Given this, is it possible for the WTO to serve as an alternative channel through which China and Taiwan can communicate and negotiate, thus resolving their political impasse?
We initially hoped so. Yet reality does not seem to be as simple as we had wished.
When both countries were acceded to the WTO almost simultaneously two years ago, it was widely believed that the standardized and legalized regulations of this multilateral organization would reduce political disputes. It was therefore hoped that Beijing and Taipei, with a closer economic and trade relationship upon their accession to the organization, would be able to resolve their political standoff and initiate new and benign political interactions.
Unfortunately, the political disputes across the Taiwan Strait so far have not diminished within the WTO mechanism. On the contrary, Taiwan's disputed sovereignty has led to negative interactions on such issues as Taiwan's representative office title, rights and status.
In terms of status, for instance, China said immediately after Taiwan's accession to the WTO that the cross-strait trade relationship cannot develop unless it is within a one-China context, and that the relationship should be viewed as China's trade relations within its own single-tariff area.
Beijing obviously wanted to downgrade Taiwan's status to something like that of Hong Kong and Macau. It also declared that economic cooperation across the Taiwan Strait is part of its domestic affairs and should be based on the one-China principle, and thus the WTO's involvement in the process is not necessary. China also denied Taiwan the rights to sign government procurement and free-trade agreements with other economies under the WTO framework.
China often deliberately changes the name of Taiwan's representation in Geneva from "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu," or Chinese Taipei for short, to "Taipei, China." This attempts to obscure and dwarf Taiwan's WTO status and make it a subordinate tariff region like "Hong Kong, China."
Beijing also requested that the WTO refuse to review Taiwan's legal documents in which official names denoting its sovereignty such as the Republic of China, the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan were used. China claimed that the use of such terms violates WTO regulations as well as a 1992 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Council chairperson's statement.
Will the WTO interactions between Beijing and Taipei ever return to basic trade and economics? This appears unlikely.
The WTO, inheriting the spirit of the Havana Charter, does not regulate, judge or intervene in political affairs. The organization even manages to reduce the impact of sovereignty-related issues. What has happened between China and Taiwan politically in the WTO so far shows that although this economic United Nations does not handle political and sovereignty-related issues, it does allow China room for its political maneuvers.
While abiding by the GATT/WTO regulations on economic issues, Beijing fully exploits the room left for political manipulation under the WTO. It looks down on Taiwan as its subordinate and avoids any WTO interactions with Taipei on an equal basis. China uses the WTO's vague regulations to further politicize, internalize and particularize the cross-strait relationship.
For the foreseeable future, China will continue to uphold the one-China principle and exploit its economic capabilities and available political space under the WTO to engulf Taiwan.
Taiwan should no longer regard the organization as merely an international trade group and neglect the available political space within it. Otherwise, China's deliberate maneuvers will ensure that Taiwan faces more political problems in the WTO.
Johnny Chiang is an assistant political science professor at Soochow University.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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