A growing number of Taiwan's political and military leaders believe that the nation should develop an offensive strike capability. In fact, every missile that China deploys opposite Taiwan increases the likelihood that the nation will consider implementing an offensive military strategy. This prospect worries decision-makers in Washington. But it makes perfect sense to many Taiwanese.
At one time, Taiwan's qualitative military superiority appeared to provide the island with adequate security -- China was deterred from launching a surprise attack or otherwise harassing the island. However, China's military modernization has diminished Taiwan's ability to adhere to a purely defensive doctrine. In addition to the 50 to 70 new missiles that Beijing deploys across the Taiwan Strait each year, China has embraced a sudden strike strategy aimed at decapitating Taiwan's defenses in a matter of only seven minutes.
It is becoming obvious to many Taiwanese military authorities and experts that no amount of PAC-3 units or PC-3 Orion submarine-killing aircraft is going to deter China. Beijing may be willing to sacrifice a substantial number of troops, aircraft, submarines and missiles to achieve its military objective -- the conquest of Taiwan. However, as one Taiwanese academic observed, China might be deterred from an attack if the island has the muscle required to destroy a significant portion of the prosperous and productive coastal regions that are vital to China's economy.
Others contend that acquiring an offensive military capability makes sense in terms of economics. Taiwan's social welfare expenditure has escalated markedly. Simply stated, this means that less money is available for defense. Whereas defense outlays constituted almost 5 percent of Taiwan's GDP in the 1990s, they have now fallen to under 3 percent. But what really complicates matters is the fact that defensive weapons cost so much more than offensive arms.
According to US military calculations, the cost-effectiveness of offensive operations against defensive ones is one to nine. That means that whenever Beijing spends US$100 million to develop offensive weapons to attack Taiwan, Taipei must spend US$900 million building defensive measures. But the actual cost is probably much higher. The costs associated with a purely defensive military strategy could prove to be astronomical.
A third consideration that prompts military planners to consider developing offensive weapons may be traced to the characteristics of the global system. In an anarchic international environment, each state is ultimately responsible for its own defense. There is no world policeman. And despite recent military actions in Iraq, the US appears unwilling to play the role of "globocop."
In the unlikely event that Washington decides to forsake Taiwan, Taipei will be better situated to deter a Chinese attack if it possesses an indigenous offensive military capability.
US officials claim to oppose Taiwan's acquisition and/or deployment of offensive arms. They reason that this development will only serve to escalate cross-strait tensions and add that the TRA only permits the sale of defensive arms. But there is much more that Washington can do.
If the US is serious about an escalating arms race across the Taiwan Strait, it should exert more pressure on China to remove the hundreds of missiles it has deployed. And Beijing should be reminded that its intimidating behavior might compel Taiwan to develop a more robust military capability. If present trends continue, decision-makers in Taiwan may come to believe that the best defense is a good offense.
Dennis Hickey is a professor of political science and Mike Welken is a graduate student in the political science department at Southwest Missouri State University.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS