A growing number of Taiwan's political and military leaders believe that the nation should develop an offensive strike capability. In fact, every missile that China deploys opposite Taiwan increases the likelihood that the nation will consider implementing an offensive military strategy. This prospect worries decision-makers in Washington. But it makes perfect sense to many Taiwanese.
At one time, Taiwan's qualitative military superiority appeared to provide the island with adequate security -- China was deterred from launching a surprise attack or otherwise harassing the island. However, China's military modernization has diminished Taiwan's ability to adhere to a purely defensive doctrine. In addition to the 50 to 70 new missiles that Beijing deploys across the Taiwan Strait each year, China has embraced a sudden strike strategy aimed at decapitating Taiwan's defenses in a matter of only seven minutes.
It is becoming obvious to many Taiwanese military authorities and experts that no amount of PAC-3 units or PC-3 Orion submarine-killing aircraft is going to deter China. Beijing may be willing to sacrifice a substantial number of troops, aircraft, submarines and missiles to achieve its military objective -- the conquest of Taiwan. However, as one Taiwanese academic observed, China might be deterred from an attack if the island has the muscle required to destroy a significant portion of the prosperous and productive coastal regions that are vital to China's economy.
Others contend that acquiring an offensive military capability makes sense in terms of economics. Taiwan's social welfare expenditure has escalated markedly. Simply stated, this means that less money is available for defense. Whereas defense outlays constituted almost 5 percent of Taiwan's GDP in the 1990s, they have now fallen to under 3 percent. But what really complicates matters is the fact that defensive weapons cost so much more than offensive arms.
According to US military calculations, the cost-effectiveness of offensive operations against defensive ones is one to nine. That means that whenever Beijing spends US$100 million to develop offensive weapons to attack Taiwan, Taipei must spend US$900 million building defensive measures. But the actual cost is probably much higher. The costs associated with a purely defensive military strategy could prove to be astronomical.
A third consideration that prompts military planners to consider developing offensive weapons may be traced to the characteristics of the global system. In an anarchic international environment, each state is ultimately responsible for its own defense. There is no world policeman. And despite recent military actions in Iraq, the US appears unwilling to play the role of "globocop."
In the unlikely event that Washington decides to forsake Taiwan, Taipei will be better situated to deter a Chinese attack if it possesses an indigenous offensive military capability.
US officials claim to oppose Taiwan's acquisition and/or deployment of offensive arms. They reason that this development will only serve to escalate cross-strait tensions and add that the TRA only permits the sale of defensive arms. But there is much more that Washington can do.
If the US is serious about an escalating arms race across the Taiwan Strait, it should exert more pressure on China to remove the hundreds of missiles it has deployed. And Beijing should be reminded that its intimidating behavior might compel Taiwan to develop a more robust military capability. If present trends continue, decision-makers in Taiwan may come to believe that the best defense is a good offense.
Dennis Hickey is a professor of political science and Mike Welken is a graduate student in the political science department at Southwest Missouri State University.
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