When Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997, China promised the Special Administrative Region a high level of autonomy except in foreign affairs and national defense. Hong Kong was to retain its free market economy and its way of life for 50 years. Under Hong Kong's Basic Law, two democratic reforms were implicitly promised: the selection of the chief executive by universal suffrage after 2007, and an increase in the number of seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo)elected by the people after 2008.
On April 6, the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress issued a binding interpretation of the Basic Law that it alone had the authority to determine the content and timing of any reform amendments. Hong Kong's leading pro-democracy lawmaker, Martin Lee (
Deng Xiaoping's (
Beijing's recent action to forestall democratic reform and Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's (
There are, no doubt, some Taiwanese who would seriously consider unification with China once it evolved into a fully democratic country. There are US policymakers who support Taiwan's de facto independence from China but only until China becomes a democracy. The lesson from Hong Kong is that democracy in China is a pipe dream as long as the Chinese Communist Party is in control.
In contrast to Hong Kong, Taiwan has a great opportunity to develop its democracy. It has a brighter future than Hong Kong because it is different in several ways. Hong Kong has to rely on China for water and food. It has no choice but to become a part of China. Taiwan is a prosperous island, protected by the Taiwan Strait. It has the resources to be an independent nation. Hong Kong was ceded to Britain by an "unequal" treaty. Even those Hong Kong people who dislike Chinese rule would agree that Hong Kong's reversion to China was appropriate.
Taiwan was ceded by the Qing Dynasty to Japan in 1895. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, but no recipient was named. According to the principle of self-determination, only Taiwan's people can decide their future status.
The residents of Hong Kong are mainly Han people. The great majority of Taiwanese are a mixture of Chinese and Aboriginal people of Austronesian extraction.
The people of Hong Kong regard themselves as Chinese. The great majority of Taiwanese people identify themselves as Taiwanese. Only 10 percent call themselves "Chinese." The rise of this national consciousness is due to a unique history and a struggle to achieve Taiwan's "economic miracle" and democratization of a once-autocratic political system.
Taiwan is capable of defending its sovereignty, and now that it is a democracy, it has the support of fellow democracies, particularly the US and Japan, in continuing as a de facto independent nation.
To maintain the status quo, however, the newly reelected Democratic Progressive Party administration must carry out three crucial tasks: stem growing economic dependence on China, bolster Taiwan's national defense -- in terms of both hardware and building a national will to preserve freedom -- and improve relations with the US by fostering mutual trust. The work will be hard but necessary if Taiwan does not wish to become a second Hong Kong.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance commentator based in Pennsylvania.
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