The US and Taiwan are both having presidential elections this year. China, which lays claim to Taiwan, not only opposes democracy for its people, but is now trying to diminish Taiwan's democracy, posing a real challenge to the US-Taiwan relationship. Resolving the problems inherent in the mix of democracy, security and elections could well be setting a precedent not only for the cross-strait issue, but for problems in other newly democratized countries as well.
As in every democratic country, especially in a presidential election, the parties use every advantage they legally can to win. The opposing parties accuse the ruling party of pursuing policies that they claim disregard the national interest.
Take the present incumbents running for re-election in the US and Taiwan, for example. In the US, once the campaigns begin in earnest, there will be many accusations about the president's conduct of the war with Iraq. One accusation that may be of interest to Taiwan is his insistence on a June deadline for turning over sovereignty to the Iraqi people. It will doubtless be said that he is turning over responsibility too early just to avoid American casualties before the election. Doing this supposedly puts the democratization of that country at risk -- an important national objective.
In Taiwan there were accusations that President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was supposedly insisting on a referendum solely to accommodate his election advantage, and in the process was in fact endangering the country's security. I was dismayed that many experts in the US, however, were also challenging Chen's integrity in a way that parroted his domestic opposition and China's claims. Like candidates running for the US presidency, wanting to get credit for having brought something good to the country for the first time is rather normal. In any event, that accusation is and should be a part of the domestic debate that is an element of any open election campaign.
The initial charges made by the experts seem to have subsided, at least in the US. It is notable that the US government has been more circumspect in these concerns. One hopes that the issue of a referendum has become more manageable (if not more clear) in the relationship between the US and Taiwan. However, the referendum issue has been replaced by another concern -- doubts about where the leadership in Taiwan is taking the country. The middle of a presidential election campaign is not the best atmosphere for any candidate to lay out what would be a highly sensitive (and controver-sial) plan for either political party. Rhetorical commitments, as opposed to formal ones, are most likely to be the result.
There are some experts in the US that say any trend toward efforts by Taiwan to strengthen the people's opposition to unification would be undesirable because of the resulting instability. There seems to be no equivalent concern about the manifold efforts already being made by China to discourage independence (also causing instability). The US government has rightly been persistent in reminding both China and Taiwan that it opposes moves by either side to change the status quo. One would expect that this would be the case in this instance as well.
The best recourse in dealing with the difficult, sensitive and important tripartite relationship, and the equally difficult issues that have to be addressed on a continuous basis, is an effective means of communicating with each other. This is particularly important for the US-Taiwan relationship, as communications between the two countries do not follow the normal pattern of diplomacy. It is a jerry-built system that encourages multiple channels, reduces high-level exchanges and in no way keeps up with the changes taking place in both countries. Both sides have surprisingly similar problems.
A country's foreign ministry traditionally helps to develop and then implement approved policies on international relations. Communications with foreign governments are usually channeled through the ministry. Taiwan may not have the titles, but its "embassy" in Washington is more professional than almost any embassy, including some of those that represent very large and powerful countries. It has a far greater capability to communicate with all elements of the host government than most embassies. The same is true of the American side, though there is the inefficient necessity to work in a semi-governmental capacity.
There are other means of communicating, but the leadership in both countries do not use their foreign ministry to full advantage. The leadership of both sides are prone to wanting that special attention (ie, their own) be given to more sensitive foreign relationships, especially those that have domestic political implications. But leaders are busy people. Just keeping up with the current crisis, whatever that might be, means that less attention can be given to other important relationships.
The answer is to trust and use the resources already in place and trained for its mission. That's not easy in the constant pressure for attention, the differences between senior members of an administration and the ego that comes with leadership. Yet the result is often misunderstanding, or belated attention when a crisis already exists. The need to address more complex security issues while maintaining the human rights of individuals under a democratic system will be a continuing challenge. And the need for ever better communications is not just unique to Taiwan-US relations, but also to many other newly democratic countries -- South Korea and Morocco, for example.
This is a very difficult cure. A leader wants to set his own priorities. But there could be nothing more important for them than to understand the potential consequences of a mistake in such a place as the cross-strait issue. Frequent communications between the leadership in Taiwan, China and the US would help remind them that a mistake could mean at least one of them might be faced with expulsion for having "lost Taiwan." That ought to be quite an incentive to keep communications open.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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