On Jan. 16, President Chen Shui-bian (
The first question: The people of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile wea-pons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities?
The second question: Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiation with China on the establishment of a "peace and stability" framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?
In an interview with the Central News Agency immediately after the announcement, I said that I thought the first question was reasonable. It reminds our citizens of the reality of the cross-strait relationship.
With frequent business exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, enormous investment by Taiwanese businesspeople in China, and many Chinese brides settling down in Taiwan, the current cross-strait situation may appear fine. However, the fact is that Beijing is hostile and has never given up the use of force against Taiwan. Therefore, the first question encourages the people to give serious thought to how to strengthen Taiwan's defensive capabilities and readiness in response to the People's Liberation Army's ambition. It is the most fundamental and passive defense that a sovereign country can take.
We are not militant but we need to prepare for war to avoid war. Isn't this reasonable?
I thought the second question shows goodwill. It embodies the collective will of the government and people that the cross-strait issue must be resolved through negotiations on a democratic and equal basis. We never opt for the use of force. Interaction across the Strait must be carried out under peaceful and stable circumstances. Even faced with China's intimidation and military aggression, Taiwan is still willing to engage in negotiations. Aren't we showing enough goodwill?
I am for a referendum to be held together with the presidential election on Mar. 20. The president is entitled by the Referendum Law (公民投票法) to organize such a referendum on national security issues. It is a defensive referendum as well as a peace referendum. The first question recognizes the current situation while the second one looks into the future.
I hope that voters will consider the great significance -- the fact that this referendum allows them to consider and decide cross-strait policies. It is not only a right but also responsibility.
In the past month, the US expressed opposition to a referendum being held because Washington misunderstood it as a move to cause cross-strait confrontation and tension. The pan-blue camp, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP), thus suddenly put a halt to all their referendum proposals. They maintained that they were giving due consideration to the overall situation. But in fact, they were losing ground.
It is understandable that the US had doubts over the referendum before its specific content was unveiled. Yet as national leaders, KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and PFP Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) did not understand the situation or push the government to unveil the questions, nor did they show wisdom by proposing a better version. Instead, inexplicably, they signaled an immediate retreat.
I commented early last month that being so cowardly and wobbly, Lien and Soong can hardly be trusted with their political judgment. They reversed their stance on the Referendum Law in December from strongly opposing it to directing its passing. Last month they again reversed themselves, going from proposing five questions for a referendum to withdrawing all of them.
Without considering the necessity of the Referendum Law, Lien and Soong changed their position from opposition to domination, and -- without considering the legitimacy of a defensive referendum -- they changed from a wait-and-see attitude to opposition. Even after the two questions were announced, I have not heard the two parties, Lien or Soong, publicly comment on the legitimacy of the questions. They only ridiculed them as a way that the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) administration found to get out of the standoff with the US.
They avoided discussing the issue itself by questioning the legality of the referendum. They were scared to explain why Taiwan is not being threatened by an external force or why Taiwan's sovereignty is not at risk of change under Beijing's military aggression. Judging from the case of the referendum, Lien and Soong's wobble on national policies is worrisome.
Let's go back to the issue of the legitimacy of the referendum and the consistency of such a policy. The government and Chen have based their policies on the "five noes" formula announced in Chen's inauguration address and the "three recognitions and four suggestions" made by an inter-party task force that focuses on cross-strait issues.
From these formal announcements and informal suggestions, we can easily understand that the two referendum questions are not only reasonable and show goodwill; they are also legitimate and consistent. They are in accordance with the following four stances:
First, the "status quo" of the cross-strait relationship is a result of history. China and Taiwan are two separate nations and systems that have not represented or belonged to each other for a long time. They are obviously one country on each side of the Strait. Since Taiwan is a democracy, any change to the status quo requires the consent of the people of Taiwan via democratic means.
Second, China's military threats and "one China" and "one country, two systems" policies are unreserved attempts to change the status quo, which is that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign democracy named the Republic of China.
Third, it is essential and legitimate for Taiwan to resort to a referendum, the most direct democratic procedure, in face of an external threat that could interfere with national sovereignty. The referendum on the one hand calls upon Beijing to give up its use of force against Taiwan. On the other, it does not give up the aspiration of peaceful negotiations with Beijing.
Fourth, the referendum appeals to self-defense capabilities first and then peace, democracy, and prosperity. It aims at the best interest of the peoples on the two sides by negotiating with the utmost sincerity and patience to establish a new framework for cross-strait relations.
In light of the legitimacy and consistency of the referendum, Beijing has obviously exhausted its arguments. It first accused Taiwan of ruining cross-strait peace and then made up stories about Taiwan attempting to "change the status quo using the referendum with the excuse of preventing China from invading Taiwan."
It also said that Taiwan "neither accepts one China nor the consensus reached in 1992 but promotes progressive pro-independence activities such as `one country on each side of the Strait,' desinicization and `call Taiwan Taiwan.'" It censured Taiwan for "destroying the foundation upon which cross-strait relations could further develop and severely threatening peace and security in the region."
Compared with the four stances mentioned above, China's cross-strait policies are arrogant, domineering and undemocratic. Beijing does not respect the will of the Taiwanese people and does not put forward appealing prospects for cross-strait peace.
How likely are the people of Taiwan to give up their right of being masters of the country, which they have defended for more than 50 years, to be annexed by undemocratic China?
The referendum on cross-strait policies marks an inevitable and legitimate milestone in the cross-strait relationship after improved popular sovereignty and the building of national identification in Taiwan over the past 20 years.
All citizens should ponder the referendum's far-reaching significance for self-defense and peace. Its materialization is surely worth being cherished and supported by all Taiwanese people.
Michael Hsiao is a national policy advisor to the president.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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