Taiwan will hold a national referendum on March 20 on two topics: one on the need to counter the Chinese missile threat and another on the building of a framework for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Even though there has been plenty of pan-blue criticism and skepticism surrounding the referendum, the vote on the issues will be a historical landmark in Taiwan's political development.
Ever since the beginning of Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s, the term "referendum" was most often equated with an "independence referendum" or to formally separate Taiwan and China. But after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) adopted the "resolution regarding Tai-wan's future" in 1999, which formally recognizes the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, the need for an independence referendum no longer exists.
After the DPP freed itself from the "Taiwan independence platform" through formally recognizing the status quo, a referendum became a useful mechanism to resolve some longstanding issues. That was the reason why the earlier proposals to hold a referendum on the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, legislative reform and World Health Organization participation received extremely high support among Taiwanese.
Using referendums to reform the Legislative Yuan in particular has received nearly unanimous support from the public. This is not surprising, because the public perception of the legislature is far from ideal. Surveys indicate that the Legislative Yuan is competing fiercely with the media for the No. 1 position as the source of Tai-wan's problems. Of course Taiwan needs referendums as a democratic instrument for decision-making.
As the two proposed topics for referendum evidence themselves, the Taiwanese can exercise direct democracy without touching upon the sensitive sovereignty issues that are likely to ignite cross-strait conflict. Referendums can not only be a useful instrument to resolve internal debates, they can also pave the way for cross-strait dialogue and negotiations.
The passage of the Referendum Law (公民投票法) last November was significant. It was another victory for Taiwanese democracy following the development of freedom of speech, the establishment of an opposition party, the removal of martial law and the emergency degree, forceful retirement of lawmakers elected in China, and direct election of the president.
Records show that the attitude and approach of those who tried to deter Taiwan from moving ahead were similar to those of today.
Actually, the anti-democracy politicians remain similar. People First Party James Soong (宋楚瑜), the pan-blue vice presidential candidate, used to serve as the Government Information Office director under martial law and he strongly defended the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) brutal suppression of the opposition. Back in 1994, now Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) fought against the popular election of the president and he is now leading the crusade to crush the first ever referendum in Taiwan.
The pan-blue critics and skeptics continue to charge that holding the March 20 referendum is illegal and unnecessary, and will cause a cross-strait crisis. It is even quietly telling the international community that this referendum is the crony of Taiwan independence and the DPP is paving the way for an independence referendum. They are of course lying just to stop Taiwan from moving forward. But eventually, the Taiwanese passionate pursuit of democracy will prevail.
Are the two topics of the referendum either divisive nor difficult as some critics portray? Legislative Yuan record shows that some pan-blue politicians enjoy slashing the budget for military procurement of any kind. It leads to repeated question from the American government whether Taiwan is determined to defend itself.
Su Chi, (蘇起) former Mainland Affairs Council chairman and chief foreign/cross-strait policy adviser to KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰), is leading the argument that "Taiwan doesn't face a threat," (Washington Post, Jan. 17.) This is an extremely peculiar and unquestionably dangerous argument indeed when China is pointing some 500 missiles at Taiwan. But this argument has been the basis for the pan-blue's boycott of the defense budget. Of course Taiwan needs a referendum topic like the one President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) proposed to settle the issue.
Meanwhile, the topic of "frame-work for peace and stability" may or may not be divisive, but it is definitely difficult because of a serious lack of progress on the cross-strait dialog in the past few years. Chen is daring China to respond to his initiative on the framework, with details provided in his press conference.
If the people in Taiwan agree with what the president proposed as the "framework for peace and sta-bility," the referendum will have a binding effect on the government no matter who wins the presidential race. The peace referendum is of course necessary, and it will certainly be an important page in the history of cross-strait relations.
The DPP has been fighting for Taiwan's democracy even before that democracy came into being. The DPP has always been the key impetus to democratization, with the KMT authoritarianism and its remnant as the key obstacle. But the DPP has overcome every obstacle so far, and will again overcome the obstacle lying ahead of Taiwan's first exercise in direct democracy.
Joseph Wu is deputy secretary-general to the president.
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