Despite encouraging signs, it is impossible to ignore a "democracy deficit" in the Muslim world, especially the Arab part of it. Only one of every four countries with Muslim majorities has a democratically elected government. Worse yet, the gap between Muslim countries and the rest of the world is widening.
Democracy and freedom expanded over recent decades into Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia, but the Muslim world continues to struggle. By the reckoning of Freedom House, a think tank devoted to monitoring democracy worldwide, the number of "free" countries around the world increased by nearly three dozen over the past 20 years. Not one has a Muslim majority.
This phenomenon has been noted within the Muslim world. In the summer of 2002, a team of Arab sacademics produced the Arab Human Development Report, written on behalf of the UN Development Program and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. It portrays an Arab world lagging behind other regions in key measures, including individual freedom and women's empowerment, as well as economic and social development.
Disturbing trends, such as a demographic youth "bulge" combined with high youth unemployment rates -- reaching almost 40 percent in some places -- highlight potentially explosive social conditions. The Arab world faces serious problems that can only be met by more flexible, democratic political systems.
The second Arab Human Development Report, issued last year, underscores the close relationship between the Arab world's educational shortcomings and its lack of democracy.
Democracy requires a citizenry informed enough to question its government. A well-educated citizenry is also essential if young men and women are to acquire the skills needed to perform the sort of jobs today's global and competitive world demands.
Alas, instead of progress, what we see is a cycle of inadequate educational opportunity leading to a lack of economic opportunity. Neither freedom nor prosperity can develop in such conditions.
Muslims cannot blame the US for their lack of democracy. Still, the US does play a large role on the world stage; and in many parts of the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab world, successive US administrations -- Republican and Democratic alike -- have not made democratization a priority.
At various times, the US avoided scrutinizing the internal workings of friendly countries in the interest of ensuring a steady flow of oil; containing Soviet, Iraqi and Iranian expansionism; addressing issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict; resisting communism in East Asia or securing military bases.
By failing to foster gradual democratization -- and yielding to a "democratic exception" in parts of the Muslim world -- the US missed an opportunity to help these countries adapt to the stresses of a globalizing world.
Continuing this policy is not in the US' interest. According to the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, US policy will be more actively engaged in supporting democratic trends globally, with no exception for the Muslim world.
This commitment was made with the full knowledge that democracies are imperfect and terribly complicated. Leaders in some Muslim states contrast democratic systems with their more orderly arrangements and point with satisfaction to the seeming stability that alternatives to democracy provide. But stability based on authority alone is illusory and ultimately impossible to sustain. Iran, Romania and Liberia illustrate that rigid authoritarian systems cannot withstand the shocks of social, political or economic change, especially at the pace that characterizes today's world.
Any doubt that promoting democracy now receives greater emphasis in US foreign policy was removed by Bush's speech of last November, in which he made clear that the Muslim world's democratic deficit is not tied to religion, but to "failures of political and economic doctrines."
Bush also made clear that Americans had learned from the past: "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because, in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export."
So the US now actively supports the extension of democracy throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, not simply for humanitarian reasons, or for theoretical reasons, but from self-interest. History shows that societies where opportunity is safeguarded tend to be societies that are good international citizens.
But, like medical doctors' Hippocratic oath, the US and others must pledge to do no harm in promoting democracy. Unrestrained zeal to make the world better could make it worse. Promoting democracy must be undertaken with humility, care, and wisdom.
Many models of democracy exist; and some models cannot be exported.
Moreover, mere elections should never be confused with democracy. Rather, what distinguishes democracy from other systems is a distribution of power both within government and within society. Until such a balance exists, elections can threaten freedom by concentrating too much authority in one person or body without providing adequate checks and balances, including independent media. Not surprisingly, this takes time, resources, and effort.
Finally, political reform must go hand in hand with economic and educational reform for all the citizens in a society, including the 50 percent who happen to be women. No country can succeed if it denies itself the talents of half of its people.
True, democracy can only be built and maintained from within, by a country's people and leaders. Outsiders, though, can and should help.
There is a role for governments, international organizations, corporations, universities, and journalists -- from the US, but also from Europe and countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa where democracy has taken root. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more important task for established democracies than helping other countries join their ranks.
Richard Haass, formerly the director of policy planning in the US State Department, is president of The Council on Foreign Relations.
Copyright: Project Syndicate/The Council on Foreign Relations
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has