Since the main goal of the US war on Iraq is to topple Saddam Hussein's government, it will be different from the 1991 Gulf War, which was aimed at liberating Kuwait. The whole world is waiting to see how the US will use its high-tech arms and war strategies to complete its invasion.
Judging from the strategic approach of both sides, the most crucial point to winning this war seems to be the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, located in the geographic center of the nation.
Urban warfare will therefore become an important factor in deciding the war. The US is certain to direct its main war effort toward Bagdad, while Iraq will deploy its elite Republican Guard in urban Bagdad and in the areas surrounding the city in the hope of fighting a Stalingrad-like defensive urban war.
The US is fully confident that a direct strike on Bagdad will lead to a quick end to the war, hoping that high-tech precision arms and superior fire power will overcome the nightmare of urban warfare and at the same time set a new standard for urban warfare.
Urban warfare is characterized by a city's strong buildings and structures, underground facilities and waterways which form military obstacles and affect the way a large army will launch an attack, thereby helping a defender hold on to a city.
But since the necessities of urban life are delivered from regions outside a city, survival will become difficult and society will lapse into chaos, in particular once electricity and water supplies have been interrupted. Further, city buildings will also restrict the mobility of attacking troops and their ability to fully utilize their fire power.
Going from house to house to pacify and subdue defenders will take time and delay subsequent war activities. The US army will therefore first attempt to isolate Baghdad from the surrounding region and rely on surprise attacks as the most advantageous method for occupying it.
However, the US must also be fully prepared to launch a forceful attack. The Iraqi army will defend the city by fully utilizing the preventive and obstructive functions of buildings to launch a resilient and flexible defense. To avoid being put under siege, the Iraqi army must secure its supply lines and store sufficient supplies and materials.
Targets chosen by the US army in an urban attack must be sufficient to cause the enemy defense system to collapse following an occupation by the US. If necessary, an attack can be divided into several consecutive strikes. It is normally necessary to first occupy enough land to suppress the urban area and access roads in the surrounding region, or tall and strong suburban buildings.
Troops normally consist mainly of foot soldiers with special warfare and assault weapons training. It is also necessary to reinforce engineering troops, chemical troops and anti-armor firepower and to add support from tanks and artillery troops. Further, paratroopers or special attack forces entering the city secretly are also required to coordinate with the attacks and destroy important enemy facilities at the right moment. It is also necessary to arrange an organization or weaponry for guerilla-like ambushes behind enemy lines in support of the frontline attack to force a quick collapse of enemy defenses.
Since the US army is expecting urban war to be unavoidable, the Marines and special forces have been given special urban warfare training and have integrated many high-tech weapons capable of solving difficulties with urban warfare-related searches, communications, intelligence and differentiation between friendly and enemy troops. This has greatly increased the US army's urban warfare capabilities.
However, since cities create strategic obstacles for large armies, Iraq can take advantage of important cities along the route of the US attack to offer step-by-step resistance, thereby increasing US losses and slowing down the movement of the US army.
The first important city along the US army's south -- north attack route is the southern city of Basra. If the Iraqi army adopts a fight-to-the-death attitude to urban warfare and manages to delay the US army's ground attack by more than two weeks, it will be able to break the edge off the American spirit and tie down tens of thousands of US soldiers in the southern war theater.
If the main force of the US army by-passes Basra and other cities and launches a direct strike on Bagdad and leaves behind a small number of soldiers in the southern war theater, it must prevent something similar to the Iraqi army's offensive at the Saudi Arabian town of Khafji during the Gulf war in 1991 from happening.
If Iraq launches a direct attack on Kuwait, it will threaten the US army's rear base and the security of its supply lines. As far as the southern battle line goes, therefore, the question of whether Basra is occupied will be the foundation for later success in the war. The US must use its superior force to quickly conquer Basra.
The great numbers of soldiers from Iraq's elite Republican Guard stationed in Bagdad will make it difficult for the US army to conquer that city. If Saddam is able to call on the people of Bagdad to resist the Americans to the death, Bagdad may become hell for tens of thousands of US soldiers.
Shen Ming-shih is a research fellow of the Taiwan Strategy Research Association.
Tanslated by Perry Svensson
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