Venezuela is mired in a dangerous stalemate. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez clings to power despite the obvious failings of his government in terms of severe economic deterioration and dangerous political polarization. The opposition, tainted by their botched coup of last April, now seeks to force Chavez from office through a costly general strike.
Both sides justify their intransigence with one-sided interpretations. His sympathizers glorify Chavez as a defender of the poor besieged by a selfish, coup-plotting elite. His fiercest opponents demonize Chavez as an autocrat pursuing a Cuban-style revolution and destroying democracy. Both interpretations are flawed. The Chavez government has not helped Venezuela's poor in any significant way. On the contrary, his belligerent rhetoric and inept governance scared off investors, inciting economic decline and boosting unemployment and poverty. Now Chavez lacks majority backing even among the poor.
The opposition comprises most of Venezuela's organized civil society, not only business, but also trade unions, professional associations, and non-governmental organizations. So Venezuela's polarization does not pit "the poor" against "the oligarchy," but a populist against civil society.
The opposition's view -- shared by rightists in the Bush administration -- is equally unconvincing. Rather than initiating a revolution, Chavez merely spouts fiery rhetoric. While his democratic credentials are dubious, he has not acted in an openly authoritarian fashion. True, he has systematically concentrated power in his own hands and has undermined governmental checks and balances. But while harassing the opposition, he has not overturned the minimal principles of democracy. Indeed, he now invokes his formal democratic legitimacy to fend off demands for his resignation.
But Chavez's insistence on the inviolability of the current constitution is hypocritical. Four years ago, Chavez deviated from the old constitution by using a plebiscite to engineer a new one, tailor-made for him. Now he invokes that charter to block calls for a plebiscite on his continuation in office.
The paradox here is that Chavez's earlier example may provide the solution to today's standoff. As Chavez used para-constitutional means to advance a desire for change in 1999, so the international community should not be confined by the present constitution in pressing to resolve a crisis that is ruining the country.
In fact, the Latin American members of the "group of friendly nations" trying to mediate this conflict can draw on interesting experiences to design such a solution. After all, confrontations like this are not unusual in Latin America's rigid presidential systems. When chief executives with fixed terms of office lose political support, they cannot be removed through a no-confidence vote, as in parliamentary systems. Presidential systems therefore risk lengthy stand-offs that threaten democracy -- as in Venezuela today.
But over the last decade, Latin American politicians have made presidential systems more flexible by finding innovative ways to remove unpopular presidents. One of Chavez's discredited predecessors was impeached on flimsy charges of malfeasance; Ecuador's Congress declared a disastrous chief executive "mentally incompetent;" in Peru, an autocratic president, after months of domestic and international pressure, was forced into exile.
While politicians interpreted the law with a good deal of creativity in these instances, they usually did so to ensure the survival of fragile democracies facing a crisis. As long as these maneuvers do not proliferate and turn into easy ammunition for the opposition of the moment, they may provide a safety valve for presidential systems.
It is to be hoped that the group of friendly nations can help design an innovative solution to Venezuela's standoff. To be acceptable to both sides, such a solution must deviate from the favorite proposals of each. The opposition prefers an "up-or-down" vote on Chavez's continuation in office, which it would most likely win -- and which Chavez will never accept.
Chavez insists on the recall referendum mechanism included in his constitution, which the opposition cannot tolerate -- removing the president in this way would require a larger absolute number of votes than Chavez garnered in the last election. But rising abstention makes this virtually impossible.
Only a democratic mechanism for conflict resolution that has an uncertain outcome has any chance of being adopted. That mechanism is an election, to be held as soon as possible. Both sides will have to work hard if they want to win. The fractious opposition will need to go beyond rejection of Chavez, elaborate a program for the country's reconstruction and unite behind an attractive candidate.
Chavez will need to clarify the content and meaning of his "Bolivarian Revolution." Since Chavez is a skilled campaigner and the opposition so far lacks unity, he will have a realistic chance of winning -- which should make a new contest acceptable to him. Pressure from the group of friendly nations may induce both sides to accept this last chance to avoid a political and economic meltdown.
Elections can be made legitimate through a constitutional amendment shortening the presidential term, as proposed by former US president Jimmy Carter in his recent mediation effort. Since this is designed to defuse an exceptional crisis, it would not become a precedent that encourages frivolous attacks on Latin America's democratically elected governments. An election now in Venezuela will save, not undermine, democracy.
Kurt Weyland is an associate professor of government at the University of Texas and author of The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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