Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore on Saturday last week, a senior Royal Marines officer defended the UK’s transits through the Taiwan Strait.
The UK upholds the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and believes there should be no “no-go” areas for navigation, including in strategic waterways such as the Taiwan Strait and the English Channel, said General Rob Magowan, commander of the UK’s Cyber and Specialist Operations Command.
“UNCLOS enables that free flow of trade and people to enable [the] global economy. There should be no no-go areas. The United Kingdom is not proposing that the North Sea or the English Channel or the Irish Sea are no-go areas. These are free and open seas for the global commons,” he said.
UNCLOS stipulates that a nation’s territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (about 22km) from its shores. At just 33km wide at its narrowest point, the English Channel is not wholly international waters and includes overlapping British and French claims. However, the UK and France permit the passage of foreign vessels for international shipping.
Against that backdrop, Magowan said that transit through international straits such as the Taiwan Strait should not be obstructed by any state. Foreign naval vessels, while not representing trade themselves, make such transits as gestures of preserving freedom of navigation.
This position contrasts sharply with that of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials, who regularly object to foreign naval transits through the Taiwan Strait. CCP representatives, including former Chinese ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai (崔天凱), who also spoke at the forum, assert that the Taiwan Strait falls under Chinese jurisdiction.
Under UNCLOS — to which China is a signatory — that position is not consistent with international maritime law. Even if Beijing were assumed to have sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago, international waters would still exist across the Strait. At its narrowest point, there is about 140km between Penghu and mainland China; even accounting for territorial waters extending from both sides, a broad corridor of international waters remains.
In practice, Taiwan is not under Chinese sovereignty, making Beijing’s objections even less relevant, as many foreign transits are conducted in support of Taiwan’s de facto status and are unopposed by Taipei.
China’s rejection of key UNCLOS interpretations is reflected in its response to the July 12, 2016, ruling by an arbitral tribunal in The Hague, which rejected much of Beijing’s South China Sea claims. Within hours of the ruling, China declared it “null and void” and said it neither accepted nor recognized the decision in the case brought by the Philippines.
China continues to make expansive maritime sovereignty claims that critics say are inconsistent with UNCLOS, particularly in the South China Sea. Although former Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) has said Beijing never claimed the entire South China Sea, China Coast Guard operations in the region suggest a broader assertion of control.
China has repeatedly harassed other claimants, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, and has shadowed or challenged naval vessels from Australia, the US, Canada, the UK, Germany and other European countries transiting the area. Beijing has described such passages as provocations, underscoring its rejection of the principles underpinning UNCLOS, critics said.
This is why many countries — not just the UK — have become more vocal in asserting that most of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are international waters, and that freedom of navigation through them must be maintained.
UN member states such as China and Russia remain signatories to international conventions while selectively interpreting or disregarding them. Meanwhile, Taiwan adheres to UNCLOS principles despite not being a UN member — a situation that undermines the consistency of the international order.
At its core, the dispute centers on China’s objections to foreign naval activity in waters it considers sensitive, even as it is accused of conducting its own incursions into neighboring states’ territory. These include the disputed Himalayan border with India, waters around the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), Taiwan’s surrounding waters and airspace, and contested areas of the South China Sea.
China should be held to international norms, including UNCLOS obligations, regardless of its territorial claims over Taiwan or disputed maritime features. Recent disruptions to global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz highlight the risks posed by any obstruction of key maritime routes, underscoring the importance of maintaining open passage in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.
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