Sat, May 16, 2026 page8

• Taiwan’s cyberdefenses flawed

  • By Chen Ching-yun 陳清雲
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  The unauthorized hacking of Taiwan High Speed Rail Corp’s (THSRC) radio communications system last month, which forced four trains to make emergency stops and caused delays of almost an hour, has raised serious alarm bells.

  On the surface, the incident could appear to be simply a misstep by the student in question. In reality, however, it exposed the structural weaknesses of the cybersecurity defenses that protect our critical infrastructure.

  Focusing only on individual culpability obscures the deeper systemic failure. THSRC’s system was compromised, not by chance, but because of institutional complacency.

  More than just a public transport service, high-speed rail is a core component of Taiwan’s national critical infrastructure.

  The incident involved the interception of the high-speed rail’s (HSR) radio communications signals, replicating system parameters, impersonating legitimate signals and triggering emergency alerts.

  It was no simple cybersecurity issue; it has direct implications for operational safety and could escalate into a public safety or national security risk. For the communication systems tied to the safety of millions of passengers to be interfered with by external devices is not a random slip-up — it is the product of long-term systemic deterioration.

  The important issue is not the suspect’s background or whether the interference was “accidental,” but rather: Why was the system accessible in the first place? Have authentication mechanisms become merely symbolic? When were encryption methods and passwords last changed? Can abnormal signals be identified and blocked in real time?

  If a system as high-profile as the HSR can face risks of duplication and impersonation, what this means for the security of other public transportation systems and critical infrastructure is even more concerning.

  Most seriously, the incident reveals the government’s long-standing neglect of cybersecurity at the communications level.

  Discussions have largely focused on Web site attacks and personal data leaks, while overlooking the fact that communication systems are the core of physical operations. Once communications are compromised, it is not just data at risk, but train operations, signaling systems, disaster response coordination and even medical and energy dispatch systems.

  This is no longer a hypothetical risk; it is already happening.

  The HSR incident should not end with a criminal investigation alone. Simply prosecuting individuals or patching a single vulnerability would be to treat the symptoms rather than the disease.

  Authorities must recognize that the cybersecurity design and critical communication systems’ management have fallen behind the evolving threat environment.

  Aging equipment, rigid authentication systems, insufficient updates and the absence of cross-system monitoring are all long-term structural problems.

  The immediate priority should be a comprehensive national-level review. First, the government should establish an inter-agency audit mechanism for critical communications cybersecurity. This would involve conducting regular stress tests and simulated hacking exercises on systems such as the HSR, Taiwan Railway and metro networks, airports, ports, power grids and healthcare infrastructure, rather than relying on superficial paperwork inspections.

  Second, critical communication systems should be brought under national security-level management, with unified standards for encryption, identity verification and update frequencies to avoid fragmented oversight.

  Third, public procurement policies should be reformed so that cybersecurity maintenance, vulnerability reporting and real-time update capabilities become mandatory requirements, rather than secondary considerations behind price and early-stage functionality.

  At the same time, real-time monitoring and anomaly-blocking mechanisms should be established so that unauthorized signals can be identified and isolated before entering the system, rather than only reacting once alarms are triggered. Otherwise, even if multiple layers of authentication exist, the entire defense structure remains effectively meaningless while key parameters can still be reproduced.

  The HSR incident also serves as a reminder that technological capability, when lacking legal and ethical boundaries, can quickly become a source of risk. For technology and communications enthusiasts, stronger education in technological ethics and legal responsibility is needed to make it clear what can and cannot be done. More fundamentally, institutional safeguards must come first. The state cannot entrust public safety to individual self-restraint alone.

  Fortunately, the emergency stop of the HSR system did not result in casualties. However, this was not evidence of a robust system — it was luck.

  If governance continues to rely on reactive patchwork solutions, it would never keep pace with evolving risks. The key question of whether similar vulnerabilities remain hidden throughout other critical systems remains.

  The HSR cybersecurity breach is not merely an isolated incident, but a national security warning. The question is not whether trains could be stopped again, but whether the country is prepared to withstand the next major breach.

  When that moment comes, the damage could extend far beyond rail services, undermining public safety and trust in governance as a whole.

  Chen Ching-yun is a former director of the Legislative Yuan’s Bureau of Legal Affairs.

  Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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