For years, I have consistently argued against “doubting the US.” Across many columns in the Taipei Times, my position was clear: Washington remains the only power capable of intervening decisively in a Taiwan contingency.
That assessment still holds, but something has changed, and it would be irresponsible not to say it plainly: The problem today is not the US, it is US President Donald Trump.
Over the past few weeks, some pro-government voices in Taiwan said Trump’s war in Iran bolsters deterrence against China. The argument is simple: By demonstrating resolve in the Middle East, Washington sends a warning signal to Beijing.
This is not analysis. It is wishful thinking.
At the most basic level, deterrence depends on capability, credibility and focus. Trump’s Iran war undermines all three.
Start with capability, or what analysts have begun calling “missile math.”
Trump has repeatedly implied that US military power is effectively limitless. In reality, modern precision munitions are expensive, slow to produce and available only in finite numbers. Reporting and defense analysis suggest that the Iran conflict has already consumed large quantities of cruise missiles and air defense interceptors — some of which are critical for a potential Indo-Pacific contingency.
Replenishing these stockpiles is not a matter of weeks. It could take years.
This is the core insight highlighted in analyses of US missile use: Modern war is not just about firepower, but about industrial sustainability. Power is not what you spend in a single strike — it is what you can sustain over time.
From Beijing’s perspective, every missile used in the Middle East is one less available for a Taiwan scenario.
That is not deterrence. It is depletion.
Second, the Iran war raises a classic strategic danger — overextension.
History is remarkably consistent on this point. From Napoleon Bonaparte to Adolf Hitler, great powers do not usually lose because they are weak. They lose because they fight on too many fronts at once.
A two-theater strain divides attention, resources and planning capacity. The US has spent decades trying to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific region. Becoming re-entangled in the Middle East moves in the opposite direction.
For Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the signal is not US strength. It is US distraction.
Third, China is not being deterred — it is learning.
Wars are not just contests of force; they are sources of information. The Iran conflict offers Beijing a real-time case study in US operations, logistics and decisionmaking under pressure. It reveals its strengths and vulnerabilities.
No serious strategist would assume that China is “intimidated” by this. A more plausible interpretation is that it is observing, adapting and calculating.
None of this means Taiwan should embrace a simplistic “abandonment” narrative. I continue to reject traditional forms of “doubting the US.” Washington remains structurally indispensable to Taiwan’s security, but it is critical to distinguish between long-term structural alignment and short-term leadership risk.
Trump’s foreign policy style — impulsive, self-aggrandizing and strategically inconsistent — introduces a level of unpredictability that Taiwan cannot afford to ignore. Security commitments are not just about power; they are about judgement.
However, the most dangerous problem might lie in Taiwan itself.
If we convince ourselves that “US wars elsewhere make Taiwan safer,” we are not analyzing reality — we are escaping from it. Such thinking encourages complacency at precisely the moment when clarity is most needed.
Small states cannot afford strategic illusions.
Trump’s Iran war is not a carefully calibrated move to deter China. It is a regional conflict with global consequences — many of which cut against US interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
If anything, it risks diluting US power, dividing strategic focus and offering China valuable insight.
Deterrence is built on discipline, credibility and sustained capacity. This war weakens all three.
Taiwan does not need comforting narratives. It needs clear-eyed realism.
Simon Tang is an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, who lectures on international relations.
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