It is too soon to know when or how the war with Iran would end, or what its geopolitical or economic consequences would be. However, one thing is already certain: What is meant by energy security must be rethought.
About 20 percent of the world’s traded oil and gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The recent crisis demonstrated how quickly that flow can be disrupted, placing immediate pressure on energy-importing countries and on the global economy.
The crisis also highlights that oil and gas facilities cannot be assumed to be secure. On the contrary, they are highly vulnerable to war and terrorism.
Energy security is often defined as ensuring reliable and affordable access to supplies. That definition is no longer sufficient. What recent events have exposed is that energy security must encompass the maintenance and resilience of the systems that produce, refine, transport and deliver energy.
In a world of contested transit routes, intricate infrastructure and sophisticated forms of disruption, energy security is no longer just about supply. It is about whether the system itself can function under stress.
Recent conflicts make this clear. The war with Iran, together with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, has shown that energy infrastructure is no longer collateral damage; it is a primary target. Refineries, pipelines, export terminals and electricity grids are now central to wartime strategy designed to weaken the capabilities and will of adversaries.
The change reflects new technology and “military math.” Relatively inexpensive drones, often costing less than US$50,000, can disrupt assets worth billions. Cyberoperations can destabilize grids without physical strikes. The asymmetry is striking: Low-cost attacks can generate system-wide consequences with far-reaching implications.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is accelerating risk and resilience. The rapid expansion of data centers and AI-driven computing is driving a surge in electricity demand. Yet AI is also becoming central to energy security, enabling real-time monitoring, predictive maintenance and faster responses to threats. As energy systems become more digital and more electrified, the intersection of AI and infrastructure would shape the next phase of security.
What this moment demands is a redefinition of energy security, one that takes the form of a comprehensive framework, built around 10 priorities.
First, diversify supply across regions. Dependence and concentration on any single region, particularly one exposed to geopolitical risk such as the Middle East, carries systemic consequences. This calls for expanding access to supply from the Americas, Africa and other emerging producers.
Second, diversify routes as well as sources. Energy that cannot move is functionally unavailable. This would require expanded investment in alternative corridors, including pipelines that bypass maritime chokepoints.
Third, harden critical energy infrastructure. Refineries, pipelines, LNG terminals and electricity grids must be designed and reinforced to withstand disruption.
Fourth, build active energy defense systems. Modern conflict has made energy infrastructure a primary target. Protecting it requires real-time defense — layered air and missile systems, counter-drone capabilities, and advanced cyberdefense to detect, deter and respond to attacks.
Fifth, design for resilience, not just efficiency. Systems optimized for cost and speed are inherently fragile. Energy systems require spare capacity, redundancy across critical components, and the ability to absorb and recover from disruption.
Sixth, expand and safeguard strategic reserves. Storage should not be viewed primarily as a tool to manage prices, but as insurance against disruption.
Seventh, ensure a diversified energy mix. Renewables (including solar, wind, hydro, tidal and geothermal), nuclear power and hydrocarbons each play a role in reducing exposure to shocks. In periods of acute disruption, countries might also need to turn to readily available fuels, including coal, to maintain power generation, industrial output and economic stability. While this would complicate climate objectives, excluding such options altogether is inconsistent with the realities of energy security. The good news is that the climate impact can be offset through the accelerated development of alternatives that energy security also requires.
Eighth, depoliticize energy strategy. Energy systems must be guided by the objectives of reliability, affordability and security, not by short-term politics. Frequent shifts in policy direction undermine investment, delay infrastructure development and can introduce a de facto political risk premium into energy systems.
Ninth, wherever possible, manage demand as a form of risk reduction. Efficiency lowers exposure and strengthens resilience.
Lastly, recognize that no country is insulated. In the US, energy abundance is often equated with energy security, but oil is priced globally, and disruptions abroad translate directly into higher costs at home, affecting fuel prices, supply chains and inflation. Energy independence does not mean immunity from energy crises.
The economic consequences of failing to adapt are significant. Countries most exposed to disruption face rising input costs, pressure across industries and slower growth. Energy insecurity is economic insecurity, and maximizing both has become a defining feature of military strategy.
There is a clear parallel with global supply chains. In the aftermath of COVID-19, firms shifted from a “just in time” model to a “just in case” approach that sought to strengthen resilience. Energy systems must now undergo a similar transition. It is well worth paying an added premium; delay would only drive the cost of energy insecurity higher.
Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations president emeritus, is a senior counselor at Centerview Partners, distinguished university scholar at New York University (NYU). Carolyn Kissane is associate dean and clinical professor at the NYU School of Professional Studies Center for Global Affairs and founding director of the university’s Energy, Climate, and Sustainability Lab.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
“Of course you can choose not to be Taiwanese, just do not stay here,” chairwoman of Taipei 101 operator Taipei Financial Center Corp Janet Chia (賈永婕) said in an online interview with local entertainer Tai Chih-yuan (邰智源), triggering intense discussion on social media, with politicians across party lines weighing in. In the interview, which was aired on May 14, Chia and Tai’s discussion over a meal in Taipei 101 covered Chia’s career change from entertainer to chairwoman and US climber Alex Honnold’s free solo climb up the Taipei 101 building. During the interview, Chia said, “Being on this land, we