Recent political developments in two very different regions have drawn global attention, with cautious optimism about democracy alongside concerns about instability. Viewing these events from a Taiwanese perspective, we are reassured that not all small democracies are predestined to be dictated by geopolitics. At the same time, we are compelled to reflect on our options and how our actions might shape our future.
In Hungary, Viktor Orban, a far-right nationalist and a leader of “illiberal democracy,” has been defeated after 16 years in power. Among other things, Orban’s tenure was marked by his firm objections to EU support for Kyiv and opposition to sanctions against Moscow. His defeat “removes Ukraine’s biggest nemesis in Europe,” as described in an April 13 New York Times report.
Meanwhile, a ceasefire was finally brokered between Israel and Lebanon. The sigh of relief could well be temporary, as the core political tensions remain unresolved. In Lebanon, the pause of conflict ironically serves to accentuate the seemingly unresolvable governing crisis rooted in complex causes, including a devastating civil war (1975-1990), foreign interventions and a fragile banking-based economy.
Put simply, modern Lebanon is a state caught in prolonged paralysis: formal institutions continue to exist, but political power is so fragmented that the government has repeatedly failed to provide basic services or sustained economic stability.
Together, these developments raise a broader question: What futures await states that are neither collapsing nor fully stable, but operating under chronic strain? What, on the road of modern state-building, must a young democracy avoid or focus on as it faces external pressure and internal divisions? What, to be specific, can Taiwan learn from these news stories?
The case of Ukraine is often framed as a confrontation between democracy and authoritarian expansion. Yet before Russia’s invasion in 2022, Ukraine already faced significant challenges: rampant corruption, uneven institutional reform and deep divisions over language, identity and its relationship with Russia and Europe.
Since the invasion, Ukraine has become an example of how an external threat can consolidate internal identity and mobilize civil society. A state that many observers initially expected to collapse within days instead mounted impressive resistance, and a richer Ukrainian national identity developed through the lived experience of war.
Indeed, wartime conditions have facilitated the development of civic networks and adaptive governance practices that partially compensate for institutional stress. For example, volunteer groups and local non-governmental organizations have bridged gaps in service delivery, provided humanitarian aid to front-line communities and participated in recovery and reconstruction planning.
Lebanon represents a different trajectory altogether. Once described as a cultural and financial hub of the Middle East, Beirut’s political system has for years been characterized by institutional fragmentation, overlapping centers of authority and cycles of economic crises. Lebanon can be seen as a state stuck in a prolonged state of limited governance: a state that continues to exist, but whose ability to integrate decision-making across institutions is persistently constrained.
Lebanon’s civil society is highly capable. Yet much of its activity has been oriented toward alleviating immediate social needs rather than addressing this deeper crisis of governance. The state, therefore, remains unstable, and a coherent national political direction has yet to emerge.
It is in this context that, in 2016, Chinese state media advocated for the “Lebanonization” of Taiwan, namely, an agenda to engineer long-term fragmentation and instability in Taiwan to render its central government incapable of governing. While this language might be analytically imprecise, it signals a real possibility of a manufactured ungovernability crisis.
As described by political scientists Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum, historian Anne Applebaum and others, authoritarian actors have mastered the art of defeating democracy through manipulating democratic means.
Beijing’s tactics are intentional in this regard. Its frequent military exercises, aggressive diplomatic maneuvers and intensive cognitive warfare have contributed to the strains on effective governance in Taiwan.
The ongoing chaos within the legislature continues to freeze budgets, derail plans to upgrade self-defense and deepen citizens’ political apathy.
Ukraine highlights cohesion under existential pressure. Lebanon highlights fragmentation under chronic institutional strain. Taiwan sits uncomfortably between these two scenarios.
This leaves Taiwan at a crossroads in its unfolding process of modern state-building, as this embattled democracy seeks to secure its sovereignty, strengthen institutional capacity and maintain policy continuity in a precarious geopolitical environment.
At this juncture, civil society faces a demanding task: not only to express preferences (through voting) or discontent (through activism), but to contribute to the formation of coherent political agendas that can sustain governance. This includes deeper engagement in policy debates on national defense, budgets, trade and other issues, moving beyond symbolic positioning toward thoughtful consideration of trade-offs, constraints, compromises and broader implications. It means fostering public discourse that prioritizes long-term capacity over short-term disruption. The challenge is to encourage healthy disagreement without paralyzing the state.
The question Taiwan faces is not only about external threats. It is also about whether civic and political institutions can foster internal trust, coordination and legitimacy over time. That internal institutional capacity, paradoxically, might prove to be the most critical resource in addressing external pressures.
Lo Ming-cheng is a professor of sociology at the University of California, Davis, whose research addresses civil society, political cultures and medical sociology.
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