The collapse of peace talks between the US and Iran in Islamabad is a reminder of the fragile limits of diplomacy by middle powers navigating between great-power rivalries.
An ambitious coalition of nations, led by Pakistan and backed by China, alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, pulled off something remarkable just by getting Washington and Tehran to the table to talk.
However, keeping them there is a different thing and that gap was brutally exposed.
Tensions are set to escalate even further: US President Donald Trump has ordered a full naval blockade of the strategic Strait of Hormuz.
The idea that US Vice President J.D. Vance could swoop into Islamabad and resolve 47 years of enmity in a weekend was always dubious — a reflection more of American arrogance than the realities of dealing with Tehran on the ground. After 21 hours of talks aimed at ending six weeks of war, Vance flew home without a deal. The Iranians played hardball on key issues — and the two sides remain deadlocked over Tehran’s nuclear program and control of the strait.
Still, the efforts of this unlikely coalition to bring about an end to the crisis reflects the rise of an emerging regional order, born out of necessity rather than any natural alliances. These are not the usual suspects of global diplomacy and they do not fully trust each other, but they all have a stake in working toward a lasting peace: Keep the oil flowing, avoid a wider regional war and limit the costs of escalation. Asian economies are particularly impacted by a closure of the strait, taking almost 90 percent of the energy exported through it last year.
Pakistan’s role has been the most consequential. Its engagement with the Middle East goes back decades and Islamabad has played a pivotal intermediary part before — most notably as a secret channel in the 1970s opening up relations between the US and China. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger went to Beijing for his historic visit via Pakistan.
Today, the country occupies a similarly unusual position. It is one of the few countries with working relationships across Washington, Tehran, Beijing and the Gulf.
Pakistan is also among the worst affected by continued disruptions to energy supplies and the risk of being drawn in to a wider regional war via its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia. A prolonged conflict would affect it directly because it shares a 900km border with Iran through Balochistan — Pakistan’s largest province, already burdened by poverty and a long-standing insurgency. The last thing Islamabad needs is instability bleeding into its own territory across that frontier.
The role of peace broker also offered an opportunity to rectify a global image shaped by the war on terror and the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by US special forces on Pakistani soil. The powerful military chief, Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir, has cultivated closer ties with Trump to rebuild a relationship that had frayed in recent years. He personally greeted both delegations as they arrived.
However, there is a difference between being trusted by everyone and being able to move powerful players toward peace.
China’s role was less visible, but also important. As Pakistan’s financial backer and Iran’s largest trading partner, Beijing holds leverage few others do. It has quietly supported back-channel efforts and worked alongside Islamabad on proposals for de-escalation. Iranian officials have credited a late Chinese push with helping secure their acceptance of the ceasefire, a role later acknowledged by Washington.
However, even China’s nudging was not enough when the US and Iran dug their heels in. Beijing has its own important incentives — Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) are due to meet next month and a cemented truce would have cleared the decks so that China can talk to the US with no other agenda in mind. The fact that it could not push Tehran toward a deal is a reflection about the limits of influence in a high-stakes, complex negotiation, especially when Washington is the other party at the table.
For Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, the calculus was always more transactional than transformational. Ties between the three Sunni-majority countries have been tense in recent years over the fallout from the Arab Spring, but have warmed recently, and all have a stake in avoiding a wider regional war.
That is the central problem with a coalition built on interests rather than trust — it can buy time, but it cannot guarantee outcomes. Iran’s nuclear program, regional proxy dynamics and long-standing rivalries remain unaddressed. Resolving those requires Washington and Tehran to want the same thing.
Still, this moment matters. A new generation of nations showed it is willing to take diplomatic risks that would once have been unthinkable, but it also revealed the limits of that ambition. As always, when great powers dig in, the rest of the world is at their mercy.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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