The opposition’s decisive victory over Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s ruling Fidesz party has been greeted with relief across the democratic world. Armed with a constitutional majority, the center-right Tisza party and its leader, Peter Magyar, are now poised to dismantle Orban’s 16-year grip on state institutions.
However, what will be harder is confronting the public demand for illiberal rule that sustained it.
Tisza’s success shows that even a highly entrenched regime can be defeated at the polls, despite institutional capture, media dominance and electoral engineering.
Illustration: Mountain People
This matters because Orban’s Hungary has long been more than a national story. It provided proof of concept for the global new right, demonstrating that a politics opposed to human rights and equality is viable in the West.
Orban was unusually explicit about this ambition. Educated at the University of Oxford on a scholarship funded by George Soros, he turned against the liberal order with a clarity and consistency that few of his counterparts could match. It is no coincidence that new-right figures like US Vice President J.D. Vance, who visited Hungary just days before the election to campaign for Orban, have drawn intellectual and political inspiration from his rule.
Magyar now enters office with the institutional advantages that once sustained Orban’s rule. Hungary’s majoritarian electoral law gives a significant advantage to the largest party. For years, Western observers rightly criticized this system. Tisza should now be credited for using the system to its advantage. By consolidating virtually all support across the opposition spectrum, it secured roughly 53 percent of the vote — nearly matching Orban’s result four years ago — and translated that into a constitutional supermajority.
Orban’s swift concession and personal congratulations to Magyar suggest that fears of institutional obstruction in the transition of power might not materialize. Taken together, these developments represent a genuine victory for European democracy.
However, the danger is once again to declare “the end of history.” Hungary’s illiberal system endured for 16 years not only because of brinkmanship and repression, but also because it met a durable social demand — for xenophobia, hierarchy and a politics of division.
That demand has not disappeared. By most conventional policy measures, Orban’s record has long been disastrous, with the economy lagging and public services in disarray, but Hungarian voters elected him four times. Even now, in defeat, Fidesz and Our Homeland Movement, a more extreme far-right party, command the loyalty of about 43 percent of the electorate. This is hardly a fringe.
There is ample experience of liberal governments returning to power after new-right rule, from former US president Joe Biden to former British prime minister Keir Starmer and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. In none of those cases did electoral victory produce systemic catharsis. Swing voters changed sides, but the core electorate that sustained these regimes did not.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Poland. In 2023, after two terms of new-right rule, the broad coalition led by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk won a result marginally stronger than Tisza’s. Yet this did not produce a lasting political realignment. Less than two years later, Poles elected hard-right Karol Nawrocki as the country’s semi-executive president. Electoral victory changed the government — but not the electorate.
Faced with that reality, Tusk adjusted. His government has shifted rightward on issues such as immigration and LGBTQ+ rights. Magyar is already decidedly following the same path. A longtime Fidesz insider, he has never been a committed liberal. Determined to defeat Orban, liberal and left-wing voters showed unprecedented discipline by rallying behind Tisza, leaving their own parties without representation in the new parliament. As a result, much of Orban’s conservative policy agenda might continue.
This political calculus need not constrain liberal actors outside government, including civil-society groups, academics, educators and journalists. As illiberal democracy endured because of popular demand, its defeat will require confronting that demand directly. Liberals must treat Hungary not as a system to repair, but as a society to persuade.
The current disillusion with Orban creates a rare opening. Domestic and international experts can help a post-Orban government deliver tangible gains, including better schools, more reliable healthcare and a less corrupt state, but liberals should not fall into the trap of regarding such improvements as “non-political” and expecting them to speak for themselves. They must be framed and defended as the product of an open society — one that can deliver effective government, and a broader sense of dignity and social cohesion.
Hungary stands to gain politically and economically from moving closer to countries like Switzerland and the Netherlands. Those societies accommodate their more conservative elements while remaining open and globally engaged. It makes far more sense for Hungary to embrace such a model, rather than the authoritarian playbook of Russia or Turkey.
Reversing a decade and a half of normative change will not be easy, but unless addressed head-on, the myths, resentments and paranoia fueling Orban’s brand of illiberalism will remain intact and available to be reactivated.
Maciej Kisilowski, an associate professor of law and strategy at Central European University, is a 2025-2026 Europe’s Future Fellow at the Institut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
In the event of a war with China, Taiwan has some surprisingly tough defenses that could make it as difficult to tackle as a porcupine: A shoreline dotted with swamps, rocks and concrete barriers; conscription for all adult men; highways and airports that are built to double as hardened combat facilities. This porcupine has a soft underbelly, though, and the war in Iran is exposing it: energy. About 39,000 ships dock at Taiwan’s ports each year, more than the 30,000 that transit the Strait of Hormuz. About one-fifth of their inbound tonnage is coal, oil, refined fuels and liquefied natural gas (LNG),
On Monday, the day before Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) departed on her visit to China, the party released a promotional video titled “Only with peace can we ‘lie flat’” to highlight its desire to have peace across the Taiwan Strait. However, its use of the expression “lie flat” (tang ping, 躺平) drew sarcastic comments, with critics saying it sounded as if the party was “bowing down” to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Amid the controversy over the opposition parties blocking proposed defense budgets, Cheng departed for China after receiving an invitation from the CCP, with a meeting with
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is leading a delegation to China through Sunday. She is expected to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing tomorrow. That date coincides with the anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which marked a cornerstone of Taiwan-US relations. Staging their meeting on this date makes it clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends to challenge the US and demonstrate its “authority” over Taiwan. Since the US severed official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, it has relied on the TRA as a legal basis for all
To counter the CCP’s escalating threats, Taiwan must build a national consensus and demonstrate the capability and the will to fight. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often leans on a seductive mantra to soften its threats, such as “Chinese do not kill Chinese.” The slogan is designed to frame territorial conquest (annexation) as a domestic family matter. A look at the historical ledger reveals a different truth. For the CCP, being labeled “family” has never been a guarantee of safety; it has been the primary prerequisite for state-sanctioned slaughter. From the forced starvation of 150,000 civilians at the Siege of Changchun
RSS