In a renewed era of great-power competition, major powers are struggling to win wars against weaker opponents.
Russia’s failure to subjugate Ukraine after four years of conflict is one example. Similarly, the US-Israel military raids against Iran are shaping up to be a Pyrrhic victory, as the Iranian regime might survive in some form, despite the disproportion of forces on the battlefield.
China could be next in line to experience the intricate complexity of modern warfare.
Underdogs Ukraine and Iran are avoiding complete defeat by masterfully leveraging military and economic asymmetries.
Kyiv has reined in Russia’s invasion by rapidly becoming one of the most high-tech militaries in the world. Even US allies in the Persian Gulf are seeking Ukrainian assistance against drone strikes from Iran.
Iran has so far been able to use its relative military strength to create chaos and unbalance the global economy — a tactic designed to pressure the international community into stopping US-Israeli attacks.
In its retaliatory assaults on the US and allied positions in the Middle East, Iran has exploited its geography, as about 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas passes through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iranian security forces have effectively closed.
If Taiwan could survive a surprise first strike, it could replicate the asymmetric tactics used by Ukraine and Iran to counter Chinese aggression. It could rely on missile and drone saturation to create a “kill zone” across the Taiwan Strait to prevent amphibious sorties, and pummel China’s territory and wreak havoc during the initial days of fighting.
By adopting “Iranian-style” tactics to strike military and civil targets, Taiwan could force China’s trade partners, most of whom depend heavily on deliveries from Chinese ports, to push Beijing to halt the invasion.
In this perspective, China’s central role in global commerce would become a liability. In January and February, China’s total trade-in goods was US$1.1 trillion, or about US$19 billion of shipments per day.
Taiwanese attacks on Chinese infrastructure would threaten exports of items that are critical for the modern economy, such as rare earths, magnets, chips, lithium-ion batteries, electric vehicles and photovoltaic panels.
China is also a major exporter of refined oil products, with annual exports of US$22 billion last year. The potential impact on Asian countries of a blockade on those supplies would be huge. That is underscored by Beijing’s recent decision to ban exports of diesel, gasoline and jet fuel following the disruption of oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf, which has alarmed traditional customers such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Bangladesh.
Disrupting China’s global trade and scaring its commercial partners is a strategy to gain time.
Taiwan does not necessarily need to stop Chinese amphibious operations entirely. It only needs to prevent a rapid invasion and resist long enough for US and allied forces to intervene directly in the flashpoint area, while blockading key maritime chokepoints that grant access to Chinese waters and the Taiwan Strait.
China is a regional superpower likely willing to endure major losses, but while Taiwan’s economic attrition warfare might push Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) toward a massive retaliation, he would have to weigh the political and economic cost of destroying its priceless tech infrastructure — especially chip production — and cause deeper resentment among what he calls “brothers” on the other side of the Strait.
Emanuele Scimia is a journalist and analyst covering foreign affairs and defense issues.
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