A delegation led by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) on Tuesday left for China, and Taiwan should respond with goodwill and measured expectations. Any high-level cross-strait engagement that helps lower tensions is a welcome development. The government’s approach — offering reminders and analysis rather than outright confrontation — has been relatively moderate and deserves recognition.
This moment also provides an opportunity to revisit several key concepts.
First, “peace” is not surrender. All Taiwanese want peace, but that cannot be achieved through passivity or capitulation. As Winston Churchill told then-British prime minister Neville Chamberlain following the 1938 Munich Agreement: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.” History — from failed negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT to the Tibet agreements — offers similar lessons.
The core obstacle to peace lies in Beijing’s ambition to annex Taiwan. Its confidence is rooted in nationalism, national power and military strength. Yet, constraints remain: the notion that “Chinese should not fight Chinese,” the potential intervention of the US and its allies, and the immense costs of war. Taiwan, by bolstering its defense and societal resilience, could become a fourth constraining factor.
Avoiding conflict requires a clear strategy: deepen ties with allies, enhance defense capabilities and civil resilience, and avoid direct confrontation with Chinese nationalism — leaving space for Beijing to continue framing its approach in terms of “peaceful unification.” Unfortunately, the pro-Taiwanese independence camp — wary of Chinese hegemony and totalitarianism — has allowed cross-strait hostilities to continue to escalate.
The second concept is the so-called “1992 consensus” — a made-up idea that there is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation of what ‘China’ means” — is arguably a carefully constructed ambiguity, if not a partial illusion. Internationally, “one China” widely refers to the People’s Republic of China. During former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, when Chinese delegations visited Taiwan, displaying the Taiwanese flag or other national symbols were prohibited — hardly evidence of “respective interpretations.”
Later, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) removed the part about “each side having its own interpretation of what China means,” which the KMT dared not challenge, exposing the deceptive nature of the “1992 consensus.”
Yet, the concept offers a potential structure for managing cross-strait relations. If reinterpreted with clarity and political courage — returning to the original version, for a start — it could help stabilize Taiwan’s constitutional position, appeal to voters, and create space for long-term, equal and healthy exchanges.
The third concept is that Taiwan’s constitutional framework still contains language implying “one country, two areas.” However, in practice, the system has evolved into one grounded in the sovereignty of 23 million people, governing the territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu — since a nation, by definition, consists of three elements: people, land and effective governance.
For now, Taiwan should not revise its constitution to reflect this reality. The priority today is maintaining the “status quo” and preserving peace. Any abrupt constitutional shift risks crossing not only Beijing’s red lines, but also those of Washington and its allies. This principle was central to former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) 2016 inaugural address: stability, restraint and strategic patience.
The fourth concept is “choosing sides.” China remains Taiwan’s only security threat, while the US continues to be Taipei’s most important security guarantor. In that sense, Taiwan has little choice but to align itself accordingly.
However, alignment does not mean rigidity. Democracies around the world manage China with dual approaches — engagement and deterrence. Taiwan, too, must learn to operate in a two-pronged approach: soft and hard, peace and preparedness, flexibility and resolve.
Taiwan’s two major political camps often fall into extremes. One leans so far toward accommodation that it risks passivity; the other emphasizes confrontation to the point of escalating tensions. Meanwhile, Taiwanese are caught in between, left to bear the consequences of politics that too often lacks balance.
Lee Wen-chung is a former DPP legislator.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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