Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) yesterday departed for China — with a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) expected — but an unexpected development has begun to reshape the conversation in Taipei.
Reports indicate that, following confirmation of the visit, the KMT signaled to Washington a greater willingness to support increased defense spending.
At first glance, the shift appears reassuring. After months of blocking the government’s proposed military budget, the opposition now seems open to adjustment. Yet the timing of the change raises a more fundamental question: What exactly is being signaled — and to whom?
Rather than resolving Taiwan’s long-standing debate over defense, the moment exposes a deeper issue. Taiwan’s deterrence gap is not primarily about capability. It is about political coherence.
President William Lai’s (賴清德) administration has framed increased defense spending as essential to responding to intensifying military pressure from China. The proposed multiyear package — built around operational requirements — was designed to boost deterrence in a systematic way. Yet it has repeatedly stalled in the legislature amid partisan disagreement.
By contrast, the opposition’s evolving position appears more conditional and reactive. Earlier proposals significantly reduced the scale of spending. Now, following internal debate and the announcement of Cheng’s visit, signals of flexibility have emerged — including openness to expanding the budget, albeit in modified form.
This is not simply a policy adjustment. It is a shift shaped by multiple audiences.
Domestically, it reflects an unresolved contest within the opposition between engagement-oriented and security-oriented approaches. Internationally, it suggests growing awareness of concern in Washington about Taiwan’s willingness to invest in its own defense.
However, for Beijing, the sequence carries a different meaning.
The invitation extended to Cheng — and the prospect of high-level engagement — projects the possibility of political accommodation while Taiwan’s internal debate over defense remains unsettled. The resulting narrative is one of dual-track flexibility: dialogue on one side, conditional defense adjustments on the other.
However, deterrence depends on clarity.
When defense policy appears to be contingent on political timing — or implicitly linked to parallel engagement with Beijing — it introduces ambiguity about long-term resolve. That ambiguity affects how adversaries and partners assess risk.
This dynamic is unfolding alongside a broader recalibration in US-China relations. The administration of US President Donald Trump has signaled a preference for near-term stabilization with Beijing, seeking to manage competition while addressing economic and strategic priorities.
In such an environment, expectations of partners become more demanding, not less. If Washington is adjusting its approach, it will look more closely at whether its partners demonstrate consistency in their own strategic commitments.
Recent patterns are clear: US support is strongest when partners invest credibly and steadily in their own defense.
This is not a retreat from commitments, but a recalibration of expectations.
However, Taiwan risks sending mixed signals. It acknowledges the scale of the threat, yet its internal political process produces fluctuating commitments. Even when policy moves in the right direction, inconsistency itself carries strategic cost.
This is Taiwan’s self-defense paradox: a democracy that understands the risks it faces, yet struggles to translate that understanding into sustained political coherence.
Cheng’s visit — and the policy adjustments surrounding it — do not create this paradox, but they make it unmistakably visible.
The solution is not to eliminate debate or abandon engagement. Rather, deterrence is cumulative. It is built on capability, predictability and clarity of intent.
Taiwan does not need perfect consensus, but it does need strategic consistency that is not contingent on timing, messaging or political maneuvering.
In today’s strategic environment, credibility is not measured by what is approved — but by how reliably it is sustained.
Bonnie Yushih Liao is an assistant professor in Tamkang University’s Department of Diplomacy and International Relations.
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