The oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf are often described as petrostates. However, the US-Israeli war with Iran has highlighted that they are also saltwater kingdoms, societies whose survival depends on desalination, or converting seawater into potable water at industrial scale. Life in the Gulf relies on the “black magic” of turning oil and oil revenue into water. This technological prowess has fueled the region’s dynamic growth, but now it looms as its greatest vulnerability.
Since the 1970s, the Gulf countries have embraced fossil-fuel-powered solutions to acute water scarcity. Today, the region produces more than 40 percent of the world’s desalinated water in more than 400 plants. It is difficult to overstate their dependence on desalination, which provides 99 percent of drinking water supplies in Qatar, more than 90 percent in Bahrain and Kuwait, 86 percent in Oman, 70 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 42 percent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
When the US and Israel first attacked Iran, they targeted the country’s military sites and leadership, but on March 7, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi accused the US of committing a “blatant and desperate crime” by attacking a freshwater desalination plant on Qeshm Island.
“Attacking Iran’s infrastructure is a dangerous move with grave consequences,” he said, adding that the US, not Iran, set this precedent.
While the claim remains unverified, its implications are unmistakable. Araghchi signaled a potential shift in the war’s logic: Water systems, long treated as civilian lifelines and protected under the Geneva Conventions, had been drawn into the conflict. His warning was clear. If Iran’s infrastructure were attacked, Gulf desalination plants would be fair game.
That same day, Israel bombed about 30 oil depots in Tehran and nearby Alborz province. Oil spilled into streets as a dark haze of smoke and toxic fumes engulfed the capital city. Iran has since responded by widening its targets across the region. On March 8, Bahrain reported that Iran had caused “material damage” to one of its desalination plants, although authorities clarified that there had been “no impact on water supplies or water network capacity.”
The war has since escalated. Strikes from both sides have hit all types of civilian infrastructure, from hotels to airports, erasing nearly every pre-existing taboo and redline. Among the most concerning are strikes on or near nuclear facilities. Iran has targeted the town of Dimona, just kilometers from the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center. Israel struck near Iran’s nuclear power plant in Bushehr, forcing Russian Rosatom staff to evacuate, and, more recently, attacked Iran’s uranium processing facility in Yazd and Khondab Heavy Water Complex.
However, global attention is squarely focused on fossil-fuel infrastructure. On Wednesday last week, French Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Energy Sovereignty Roland Lescure said that 30 percent to 40 percent of the Gulf’s refining capacity has been damaged or destroyed, removing 11 million barrels per day from the international market and triggering an oil crisis, particularly in Asia.
Moreover, Iranian strikes on Qatar’s Ras Laffan facilities have wiped out 17 percent of the country’s liquefied natural gas export capacity.
As oil prices surged and the Strait of Hormuz remained largely shut, US President Donald Trump issued a stark ultimatum on March 21, threatening to “obliterate” Iran’s power plants if the country did not reopen the Strait within 48 hours. In response, Iranian military spokesman Ebrahim Zolfaqari said that the Islamic Republic would retaliate by striking regional infrastructure, including “water desalination facilities.”
Shortly afterward, pro-regime Telegram and social-media channels began circulating a chilling list of potential targets, including Saudi Arabia’s Ras al-Khair and Shuaiba desalination plants and the UAE’s Taweelah desalination plant and Barakah nuclear power plant. As the Hudson Institute’s Can Kasapoglu said, the vulnerability of desalination infrastructure is a different category of risk. Unlike disruptions to oil markets, which primarily trigger economic consequences by raising prices and constraining supply, striking desalination facilities “directly threatens daily survival in some of the world’s most water-scarce states.”
Facing mounting pressure, Trump abruptly announced a five-day pause on strikes against Iranian power plants just hours before US markets opened on Monday last week, aiming to steady oil prices; he later extended the deadline to Monday next week. Despite Trump touting talks with Iran (which the Islamic Republic has denied are taking place), ongoing US military deployments to the region suggest a possible escalation. The Trump administration has also refused to rule out seizing Kharg Island — through which 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports flow — as part of an all-out effort to cripple the Iranian economy and force the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
If the US made such a move, the Gulf countries would likely bear the brunt of retaliation. After earlier US strikes on Kharg Island, Iran accused the UAE of facilitating the attacks. On Wednesday last week, Iranian Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said that if US and Israel occupy an Iranian island with the support of a regional power, “all the vital infrastructure of that regional country will, without restriction, become the target of relentless attacks.”
Although Ghalibaf was not explicit, the warning likely refers to the UAE and the islands of Kharg and Larak, but might also allude to the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, seized by Iran in 1971.
The Iranian regime is fighting for its survival. It cannot defeat the US or Israel directly, but it can inflict widespread economic pain and strain relations between the US and the Gulf, as well as among the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six members. As the clock ticks down to Trump’s deadline, would the US jeopardize the Gulf’s desalination lifelines in a risky bid to seize Kharg Island and reopen the Strait of Hormuz? If Iran retaliates “without restriction,” the consequences could devastate the Gulf’s saltwater kingdoms.
Michael Christopher Low is associate professor of history and director of the Middle East Center at the University of Utah.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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